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Moore v. Texas and the Ongoing National Consensus
Struggle Between the Eighth Amendment, the Death
Penalty, and the Definition of Intellectual Disability
Austin Holler*
In Moore v. Texas, the Supreme Court clarified its categorical ban
against the death penalty for intellectually disabled individuals, holding that
states cannot disregard current medical diagnostic criteria when making a
legal determination of intellectual disability. The Court continued to hone
the rules from Atkins v. Virginia and Hall v. Florida and correctly found that
the reliance on outdated or subjective criteria creates an unacceptable risk
of imposing a cruel and unusual punishment on such individuals.
Furthermore, the Court demonstrated the crucial importance of utilizing
legitimate and modern clinical standards to reflect a national consensus as
well as evolving standards of decency.
In the wake of Moore, states will see many appeals from individuals on
the cusp of intellectual disability seeking to overturn their death sentences.
Importantly, the Court’s decision to hear any such appeals may very well be
colored by fluctuations within the medical community in the interim. The
addition of two conservative Justices since Moore was decided, however,
means the rules from Moore, Hall, and Atkins will likely cease to expand.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States was founded on core values and individual
protections—embodied in the Constitution and Bill of Rights 1—such as
the belief that the government cannot impose “cruel and unusual
punishments” on its citizens.2 Borrowing from the English Bill of Rights,
the framers of the Constitution implemented the Eighth Amendment to
create boundaries for criminal punishment.3 The Supreme Court often
enforces the Eighth Amendment’s proscription of cruel and unusual
punishments in terms of proportionality.4 To little surprise, it has
1. See EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 57 (1957)
(noting the protections provided for the individual in terms of a limitation on the government’s
power enforced by the judiciary); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as A Constitution, 100 YALE
L.J. 1131, 1132 (1991) (describing the Bill of Rights as a duality of individual rights and protections
combined with a desire for “organizational structure” and majority rule).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”); see 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE
GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 447–48 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1891) (“In this
business of legislation, your members of Congress will loose the restriction of not imposing
excessive fines, demanding excessive bail, and inflicting cruel and unusual punishments. . . . But
Congress may introduce the practice of the civil law, in preference to that of the common law. . . .
[I]f you leave them otherwise, they will not know how to proceed; and, being in a state of
uncertainty, they will assume rather than give up powers by implication. A bill of rights may be
summed up in a few words. What do they tell us?—That our rights are reserved.”).
3. Peter Lanston Fitzgerald, An English Bill of Rights? Some Observations from Her Majesty’s
Former Colonies in America, 70 GEO. L.J. 1229, 1234–35 (1982); see also Stanley Mosk, The
Eighth Amendment Rediscovered, 1 LOY. U. L.A. L. REV. 4, 5 (1968) (explaining colonial
Americans’ concern about the harshness of the English justice system and its growing number of
capital crimes); Celia Rumann, Tortured History: Finding Our Way Back to the Lost Origins of the
Eighth Amendment, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 661, 666–67 (2004) (citing wide acceptance of the fact that
the Eighth Amendment was pulled directly from the English Bill of Rights).
4. Youngjae Lee, Federalism and the Eighth Amendment, 98 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 69, 77–78
(2013). See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 676 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“A
punishment out of all proportion to the offense may bring it within the ban against ‘cruel and
unusual punishments.’” (quoting O’Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 331 (1892))); Solem v. Helm,
463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983) (holding a mandatory life sentence is disproportionate to the defendant’s
crime and therefore unconstitutional). But see Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991)
(plurality opinion) (arguing that Solem is incorrect and the Eighth Amendment does not guarantee
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frequently operated in death penalty cases, 5 specifically forbidding
capital punishment for rape offenses6 as well as for murders committed
by minors7 or intellectually disabled individuals.8
The Eighth Amendment’s recent prohibition of the death penalty for
intellectually disabled individuals gave rise to the controversy in Moore
v. Texas.9 In Moore, the Supreme Court addressed whether a state’s
reliance on outdated medical standards and its own local precedent rooted
in subjectivity complied with the Court’s Eighth Amendment
precedent.10 At bottom, does the Eighth Amendment allow a state, in
devising a system for determining intellectual disability as a matter of
law, to prohibit the use of current medical standards and implement
whatever medical standards it wishes?11 Based on two of its recent
decisions,12 the Court held that a state cannot disregard current medical
standards or “diminish the force of the medical community’s consensus”
when determining intellectual disability, and that Texas’s use of
subjective factors was in direct violation of the Eighth Amendment.13
Notwithstanding Chief Justice Roberts’s dissenting opinion that Texas
actually complied with the Eighth Amendment in creating its own
proportional punishments).
5. In addition to the cases discussed herein, the Supreme Court has dealt with myriad cases
surrounding the death penalty and once struck down the death penalty entirely as unconstitutional
under the Eighth Amendment. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972). See Carol S.
Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of
Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 361–97 (1995), for a
discussion of the Court’s death penalty jurisprudence leading up to and following Furman.
6. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977); see also Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407,
446 (2008) (holding that the death penalty is not a proportional punishment for the rape of a child
and is thus barred by the Eighth Amendment).
7. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
8. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). Atkins created a categorical ban on the death
penalty for intellectually disabled persons. Id. See infra Part I.B.1 (discussing the holding and
rationale of Atkins).
9. Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1048 (2017).
10. Id.; Amy Howe, Argument Analysis: Texas Inmate Seems Likely to Prevail in Death-Row
Disability
Challenge,
SCOTUSBLOG
(Nov.
29,
2016,
1:59
PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/11/argument-analysis-texas-inmate-seems-likely-to-prevail-indeath-row-disability-challenge/.
11. Amy Howe, Argument Preview: Court Returns, Again, to the Death Penalty and the
Intellectually
Disabled,
SCOTUSBLOG
(Nov.
22,
2016,
2:31
PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/11/argument-preview-court-returns-again-to-the-death-penaltyand-the-intellectually-disabled/.
12. Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014); Atkins, 536 U.S. 304.
13. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1044; see Amy Howe, Opinion Analysis: A Victory for Intellectually
Disabled
Inmates
in
Texas,
SCOTUSBLOG
(Mar. 28, 2017, 1:51 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/03/opinion-analysis-victory-intellectually-disabled-inmatestexas (discussing the majority opinion’s view that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was wrong
in three different ways).
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standard and that the medical community itself was splintered in terms of
diagnosing and defining intellectual disability, Justice Ginsburg’s
majority opinion correctly applied the Court’s rules from Hall v.
Florida.14 Without further instruction on the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition of capital punishment for the intellectually disabled, as
provided by Moore, states would be free to craft and retain their own
rules—becoming inapposite with current medical standards over time—
that create the “unacceptable risk” of executing those who are
intellectually disabled.15
Part I of this Note begins by describing the evolution of the Eighth
Amendment and the definition of cruel and unusual punishment in the
United States.16 Part I continues with an account of the Supreme Court’s
recent Eighth Amendment jurisprudence regarding intellectual disability
and the death penalty, as well as Texas’s response to the Court’s rule from
Atkins v. Virginia.17 Next, Part II outlines the factual and procedural
history of Moore and discusses the Court’s decision as well as Chief
Justice Roberts’s dissent.18 Part III analyzes why the majority in Moore
was correct and in line with the Court’s Eighth Amendment precedent,
discusses the medical community’s importance in determinations of
intellectual disability, and explains why Texas’s legal standard for
intellectual disability is irreconcilable with both Hall and Atkins.19
Finally, Part IV discusses the possible impact of Moore, including how
states will now have even more difficulty imposing the death penalty,
how this decision will shape future Eighth Amendment and national
consensus inquiries, and how the Court might address broader death
penalty issues in the future.20
I. THE EVOLVING DEFINITION OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
The Eighth Amendment is a safeguard against governmental overreach

14. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1049 (asserting Hall stands for the proposition that current medical
standards cannot be disregarded in a legal determination of intellectual disability, and that when an
IQ score is near but above seventy, the duly recognized standard error of measurement must be
accounted for); see Hall, 572 U.S. at 721–22 (clarifying that, although the views of medical experts
do not strictly demand adherence during a court’s determination of intellectual disability, the
determination must be properly informed by the medical community’s diagnostic structures and
standards).
15. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1044 (quoting Hall, 572 U.S. at 704).
16. See infra Part I.A (discussing the Eighth Amendment generally, and what it means today).
17. See infra Part I.B (explaining the categorical ban from Atkins, how it was implemented in
Texas by Ex parte Briseno, and how it was fine-tuned by Hall).
18. See infra Part II (discussing Moore v. Texas, the case at issue in this Note).
19. See infra Part III.
20. See infra Part IV.
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and a protector of human dignity.21 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has
held that the Amendment itself must continue to mature with society and
gather its meaning from “evolving standards of decency.”22 To that end,
the Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments that are patently
excessive.23 A punishment is categorically excessive and thus barred
when it either makes no discernible contribution to the goals of
punishment or is clearly disproportionate to the crime itself.24 Further,
discrete categories of individuals may be exempted from specific types
of punishment, such as the death penalty, no matter what the
circumstance.25 For consistency and clarity, the Court attempts to
adjudicate Eighth Amendment cases objectively.26 In doing so, it
highlights the importance of decisions not being based on the subjective
beliefs of a justice or justices—whether in appearance or actuality—and
that the Court can meet this goal by looking to the societal attitude toward
a particular punishment, recent legislation, and juries’ sentencing
decisions.27 This Part will first discuss the general progression of the
Supreme Court’s cruel and unusual punishments jurisprudence and will
then focus on recent developments surrounding the prohibition of capital
punishment for intellectually disabled persons.

21. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (“The basic concept underlying the Eighth
Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man. While the State has the power to punish, the
Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards.”);
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005) (“By protecting even those convicted of heinous
crimes, the Eighth Amendment reaffirms the duty of the government to respect the dignity of all
persons.”).
22. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101; see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 560–61 (“To implement this framework
we have established the propriety and affirmed the necessity of referring to ‘the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society’ to determine which punishments are so
disproportionate as to be cruel and unusual.” (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 100–01)).
23. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977);
see also Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV.
677, 679 (2005) (discussing a line of cases in which otherwise allowable punishments were
analyzed for excessiveness in light of the crime committed).
24. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592; see also Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (“[T]he punishment must not
involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”).
25. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798–99 (1982) (finding an individual who did not kill
or intend to kill to be categorically different in terms of culpability from those who did so in a
felony murder case); Carol Steiker & Jordan Steiker, Defending Categorical Exemptions to the
Death Penalty: Reflections on the ABA’s Resolutions Concerning the Execution of Juveniles and
Persons with Mental Retardation, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 90 (1998) (noting
proportionality analysis sometimes presents difficulties in creating categorical exemptions).
26. Lee, supra note 23, at 689; Victor L. Streib, The Eighth Amendment and Capital Punishment
of Juveniles, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 363, 379 (1986).
27. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592.
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A. Proportionality and National Consensus Review
Well before the cruel and unusual punishments clause was interpreted
to forbid punishments that the Supreme Court deemed excessive or
disproportionate, torture and other barbaric punishments were
prohibited.28 In fact, because the Amendment was almost wholly copied
from England, it appeared, in the early days of the nation, that was all that
it disallowed.29 The Supreme Court eventually declared that it meant
more, however, in the landmark case Weems v. United States in 1910:
“The clause of the Constitution . . . is not fastened to the obsolete but may
acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane
justice.”30 Weems was the earliest Eighth Amendment decision based on
proportionality; the Court noted the fundamental “precept of justice” that
one’s punishment ought to be proportioned to one’s crime.31
Later, in Trop v. Dulles, the Supreme Court addressed whether a
punishment was contrary to principles of civilized treatment under the
Eighth Amendment.32 Trop specifically focused on the nature of the
punishment itself as excessive, being inherently violative of the dignity
of man.33 In announcing this new protection under the Eighth
Amendment, the Court continued its expansion and guaranteed it would
not remain static, but rather evolve with the nation’s sensibilities.34 As
such, punishments are to be judged not only for proportionality, but also
for fairness in light of human dignity and our “evolving standards of
decency” under the Eighth Amendment.35
28. See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135–36 (1878) (commenting on old forms of
punishment now deemed to be barbaric and clearly excessive, such as quartering, burning alive,
dissection, and disembowelment).
29. Malcolm E. Wheeler, Toward A Theory of Limited Punishment: An Examination of the
Eighth Amendment, 24 STAN. L. REV. 838, 839 (1972); see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S.
957, 966 (1991) (noting that Americans at the time may have viewed it the same as the English
did).
30. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910). In Weems, the Supreme Court held a
fifteen-year prison sentence, combined with hard labor while chained from wrist to ankle, to be
cruel and unusual for the crime of falsifying an official document. Id. at 381.
31. Id. at 367; Lee, supra note 23, at 687–88; see also Mosk, supra note 3, at 10 (highlighting
the importance of the Weems decision as it relates to a more expansive view of the Eighth
Amendment prohibiting “pervasive cruelty” outside the scope of actual torture); Wheeler, supra
note 29, at 842 (noting that Weems stands for the proposition that the Eighth Amendment limits
both the amount and nature of punishment; the opinion’s use of cruel and excessive are often
conflated with disproportionality).
32. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958).
33. Id. at 100; see also Wheeler, supra note 29, at 841 (noting that the Court did not utilize the
inhuman test or the unnecessary test to strike down the punishment in Trop).
34. Trop, 536 U.S. at 100–01; see also Ronald Turner, The Juvenile Death Penalty and the
Court’s Consensus-Plus Eighth Amendment, 17 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 157, 159 (2006)
(describing the Court’s “evolving standards of decency” test from Trop as still-governing).
35. Trop, 536 U.S. at 101; Wheeler, supra note 29, at 841–42 (noting the availability of multiple
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After broadening its substantive scope, the Court then extended the
Eighth Amendment’s reach by applying it to the states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.36 Robinson v. California,
decided in 1962, was the first case in which the Court applied the Eighth
Amendment to the states,37 and the proverbial floodgates opened
afterward.38 Significantly, the Court saw a deluge of cases focusing on
capital punishment and the Eighth Amendment.39 Looking both to
national consensus40 and proportionality,41 the Court has since prohibited
or limited the death penalty for many crimes.42
B. Intellectual Disability and the Death Penalty
While the Eighth Amendment and the death penalty were experiencing
a proportionality review renaissance, questions relating to the basic
principles of culpability, retribution, and deterrence were also at the

tests that have been used by the Court).
36. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, cl. 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . . . .”); see Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S.
459, 462 (1947) (assuming arguendo, but not making an actual constitutional holding, that
violations of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments also violate the Fourteenth Amendment); Robinson
v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (holding California’s law under which the defendant was
sentenced to ninety days imprisonment merely for having an illness—being addicted to drugs—
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment); Rumann, supra note 3,
at 665 (noting the infrequency with which the Supreme Court wielded the Eighth Amendment
throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, before the Fourteenth Amendment was
invoked).
37. Lee, supra note 23, at 688 n.42; Rumann, supra note 3, at 665 n.27. But see Mosk, supra
note 3, at 8–9 (arguing that the Court in Robinson never explicitly held that the Eighth Amendment
applies to the States but conceding that it is likely because the case dealt with a state statute, and
the Court assumed as much throughout the opinion).
38. Rumann, supra note 3, at 666; Arthur B. Berger, Note, Wilson v. Seiter: An Unsatisfying
Attempt at Resolving the Imbroglio of Eighth Amendment Prisoners’ Rights Standards, 1992 UTAH
L. REV. 565, 570–71; see also Lee, supra note 23, at 688–89 (discussing the Court’s significant
death penalty jurisprudence under Weems that did not occur until after the Court decided Robinson
in 1962).
39. Lee, supra note 23, at 689; see generally Steiker & Steiker, supra note 5 (discussing
constitutional regulation of capital punishment for the two decades following Furman v. Georgia).
40. Lee, supra note 23, at 689; see Steiker & Steiker, supra note 5, at 375 (asserting that
consensus analysis may be a subsection of the overall proportionality analysis).
41. Lee, supra note 23, at 689–90; see Steiker & Steiker, supra note 5, at 375–78 (explaining
that the Court’s proportionality review of death penalty cases has been the most significant part of
its narrowing doctrine; that is, limiting capital punishment only to those who are most deserving).
42. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (disallowing the death penalty for rape); Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (disallowing the death penalty for aiding and abetting under a felony
murder statute); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (disallowing the death penalty for
murder committed by a defendant under the age of sixteen); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551
(2005) (disallowing the death penalty for murders committed by a defendant under the age of
eighteen); see also Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 437 (2008) (stating, in dicta, that the death
penalty should not be applied in situations where an individual’s life was not taken).
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forefront.43 With several other crimes and classes of individuals
considered at this time,44 so too did the issue of intellectually disabled
persons and capital punishment arise with Penry v. Lynaugh.45 Notably,
intellectual disability was not always granted the same protections and
exemptions as mental illness, as they were frequently and improperly
conflated.46 Although the appeal in Penry failed, it set the stage for future
cases to address the national consensus regarding whether capital
punishment was appropriate for those with an intellectual disability. 47
In Penry, the Supreme Court addressed two separate questions when
reviewing the petitioner’s death penalty appeal.48 The question most
pertinent to this Note asked whether it is cruel and unusual punishment
in terms of proportionality to execute an intellectually disabled49
43. Lee, supra note 23, at 689–91. For culpability, courts compare the defendant in question to
a quintessential first-degree murderer. Id. at 689–90. This degree of culpability is then weighed
against a consideration of the retributive and deterrent goals of the punishment as carried out for
this individual defendant. Id. at 690–91. See also Youngjae Lee, Desert and the Eighth Amendment,
11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 101, 101 (2008) (arguing that the Eighth Amendment oftentimes serves as
a retributivist constraint on capital punishment by protecting certain groups of offenders from the
death penalty because they do not deserve it).
44. See supra note 42 (noting several cases in which the Court has prohibited or limited the
death penalty for specific crimes).
45. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); see also James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson,
Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 416–21 (1985). The general
existence of intellectual disability, in addition to mental illnesses or disorders, has been recognized
by society with varying terminology for centuries. Id. at 416–17. However, our country’s care and
handling of these individuals, both judicially and societally, has not always been in proper accord
with their condition. Id. at 417–19. Eventually, views of alarmists and supporters of eugenics were
quashed by experts, and courts addressed the problem of proper adjudication of cases involving
intellectually disabled defendants. Id. at 419–21.
46. See Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 45, at 423–25 (noting various internal and external
similarities between intellectual disability and mental illness, but stressing a main overarching point
in disability being a permanent impairment and illness more often being cyclical and episodic); id.
at 432 (noting “idiots,” or those with severe or profound intellectual disability, are not able to be
convicted of their criminal acts, but also that authorities have struggled to draw the line of criminal
responsibility for those with lesser degrees of disability).
47. Peter K.M. Chan, Note, Eighth Amendment—The Death Penalty and the Mentally Retarded
Criminal: Fairness, Culpability, and Death, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1211, 1233 (1990);
see also Cynthia Han, “Evolving Standards of Decency”: Legislative and Judicial Developments
Leading to Atkins v. Virginia, 9 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 469, 470 (2002) (noting the possibly
strategic mentioning in Penry of a putative national consensus against the practice in the future,
shortly followed in time by sweeping state legislative action doing just so).
48. Penry, 492 U.S. at 313; see also Michael P. DeGrandis, Note, Atkins v. Virginia: Nothing
Left of the Independent Legislature Power to Punish and Define Crime, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV.
805, 828 (2003) (noting that Penry also raised an insanity defense at trial, which was rejected).
49. The Court in both Penry and Atkins utilized the term “mentally retarded,” though the term
“intellectually disabled” has replaced it in medical terminology since those cases were decided. See
Robert L. Schalock et al., The Renaming of Mental Retardation: Understanding the Change to the
Term Intellectual Disability, 45 INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 116, 116 (2007). This
Note uses the latter throughout, unless referring to publications or academic institutions, and has
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defendant convicted of murder.50 The Court, in an opinion by Justice
O’Connor, used proportionality review under the evolving standards of
decency test to demonstrate there was no national consensus against the
death penalty for this class of individuals, and thus it was not cruel and
unusual.51 Importantly, Penry was decided by a bare majority. 52 In his
dissent, Justice Brennan argued the majority’s holding was incorrect and
inappropriate because these individuals “lack[ed] the cognitive,
volitional, and moral capacity to act with the degree of culpability
associated with the death penalty” and that “killing [intellectually
disabled] offenders does not measurably further the penal goals of either
retribution or deterrence.”53 Eventually, the dissenters’ concerns, coupled
with an increase in state legislation disallowing the practice, were strong
enough to sway Justice O’Connor’s vote.54
1. Atkins v. Virginia
The execution of intellectually disabled defendants convicted of
capital murder was constitutionally permissible until 2002, when the
Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia.55 In Atkins, the Court held that
the Eighth Amendment proscribed capital punishment for defendants
who were intellectually disabled.56 A jury convicted Daryl Renard Atkins
of murder and sentenced him to death in 1999,57 notwithstanding
testimony from a forensic psychologist that he was mildly intellectually
disabled.58 Following a second sentencing hearing—ordered by the
replaced the outdated term in quoted material.
50. Penry, 492 U.S. at 313; DeGrandis, supra note 48, at 828–29.
51. DeGrandis, supra note 48, at 829; see also Penry, 492 U.S. at 331 (“The clearest and most
reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country’s
legislatures.”).
52. Chan, supra note 47, at 1221–23. Justices Brennan and Stevens each wrote dissenting
opinions, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, respectively. Penry, 492 U.S. at 341, 349.
53. Penry, 492 U.S. at 343–44, 348 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
54. See Chan, supra note 47, at 1233–35 (noting Justice O’Connor’s crucial swing vote on a
sharply divided Court when dealing with death penalty issues, and correctly predicting that she
could be the one to tip the scales in favor of a future defendant); see also Han, supra note 47, at
470 (noting the increase from one to eighteen in the number of states that specifically outlaw the
death penalty for intellectually disabled individuals).
55. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); see also Douglas Mossman, Atkins v. Virginia: A
Psychiatric Can of Worms, 33 N.M. L. REV. 255, 259 (2003) (noting, importantly, that although
there was not a categorical exemption, defendants such as Penry and others might still present
intellectual disability as evidence to mitigate against the death penalty).
56. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 322; Mossman, supra note 55, at 255–56.
57. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 307. On August 16, 1996, Atkins and an accomplice abducted Eric
Nesbitt, took the money on his person, drove with him to an ATM and withdrew money, then took
him to an isolated location and shot him to death. Id.
58. Id. at 308–09 (“[The psychologist’s] conclusion was based on interviews with people who
knew Atkins, a review of school and court records, and the administration of a standard intelligence
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Virginia Supreme Court due to improper jury instructions—a jury once
again sentenced Atkins to death.59 Rejecting Atkins’s argument that he
could not be executed because he was intellectually disabled, the
Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed his sentence, relying on Penry to
support its holding.60 Noting the strong dissenting opinions in the lower
court’s decision, as well as the substantial changes in the legislative
backdrop in recent years, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
reexamine the issue previously raised in Penry.61
In an opinion by Justice Stevens, the Court held that the Eighth
Amendment, once again construed “in the light of our evolving standards
of decency,” prohibits the execution of intellectually disabled persons.62
The Court found a national consensus existed against the death penalty
for such individuals, looking to numerous examples of state laws that
were passed to ban the practice.63 The majority stated the consensus was
reflected not just by the number of jurisdictions making this
change—thirty-three in total, including fourteen that had already banned
the death penalty outright—but by the consistency of these changes.64
Finally, the Court noted that even among states where the practice was
not explicitly disallowed, it had become exceedingly rare.65 The Court
test which indicated that Atkins had a full scale IQ of 59.”).
59. Id. at 309 (detailing the Commonwealth’s use of its own expert to describe Atkins as having
average intelligence and possibly an antisocial personality disorder).
60. Id. at 310; see also Atkins v. Commonwealth, 534 S.E.2d 312, 319–20 (Va. 2000) (noting
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Penry that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the execution of
intellectually disabled defendants, but that such disability must be allowed to be considered as a
mitigating factor when determining punishment).
61. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 310; see also Atkins, 534 S.E.2d at 325 (Koontz, J., dissenting) (noting
the inherent limitations of intellectually disabled persons and that a moral and civilized society
must impute an accompanying lessened degree of culpability for those persons as well, such that
their execution is inappropriate regardless of their crime).
62. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (quotations omitted) (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,
405 (1986)). Notably, Justice O’Connor, the author of the Penry opinion just thirteen years earlier,
joined with the Atkins majority to overrule Penry. See also Timothy S. Hall, Mental Status and
Criminal Culpability After Atkins v. Virginia, 29 U. DAYTON L. REV. 355, 360 (2004) (addressing
the three-pronged analysis undertaken by Justice Stevens in the Court’s opinion: looking to (1)
“evolving standards of decency,” (2) proportionality, and (3) whether punitive purposes are
satisfied).
63. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314–15 (noting that, in the years following Penry, Kentucky,
Tennessee, New Mexico, Arkansas, Colorado, Washington, Indiana, Kansas, New York, Nebraska,
South Dakota, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Missouri, and North Carolina had joined Georgia,
Maryland, and the federal legislature in outlawing the death penalty for intellectually disabled
individuals).
64. See id. at 315–16 (noting the trend of passing such legislation being even more significant
due to the usual unpopularity of laws that soften punishments for violent crime).
65. See id. at 316 (explaining that two states—New Hampshire and New Jersey—have not
executed anyone in decades and that only five states—Alabama, Texas, Louisiana, South Carolina,
and Virginia—had executed individuals shown to have an IQ lower than seventy).
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noted the only serious disagreement remaining in these cases lied within
the actual determination of intellectual disability. 66 In line with its Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, the Court left to the states the task of creating
their own appropriate tests to uphold the constitutional ban it set forth.67
Although states may have disagreed about the range of individuals
encompassed by this new constitutional prohibition, the Court maintained
that the national consensus reflected the view that intellectually disabled
individuals are comparatively less culpable than those who are not.68
Furthermore, with culpability taken into account, the Court posited that
the penological purposes served by the death penalty could not
reasonably be met by executing those who are intellectually disabled.69
This was, in part, because the punitive concepts of retribution and
deterrence cannot apply to those who lack the requisite culpability for and
control over their actions, directly harking back to Justice Brennan’s
dissenting opinion from Penry.70 Finally, the Atkins majority reasoned
that a categorical ban in these cases was even more necessary because
intellectually disabled defendants—as a result of their reduced
capacity—are at an increased risk of being improperly sentenced to
death.71 In sum, the majority did not hesitate to agree with the swath of
66. Id. at 317. In this case, Virginia disputed the fact that Atkins was, in fact, intellectually
disabled. Id.
67. Id.; see, e.g., Ford, 477 U.S. at 427 (prohibiting the execution of the insane or mentally ill
under the Eighth Amendment but allowing individual states “substantial leeway” to balance various
interests at issue).
68. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317–18; see also Kenneth L. Appelbaum & Paul S. Appelbaum,
Criminal-Justice-Related Competencies in Defendants with Mental Retardation, 22 J. PSYCHIATRY
& L. 483, 487–89 (1994) (describing these individuals’ basic deficiencies in communication,
cognition, problem-solving, logical reasoning, impulse control, and volitional understanding).
69. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317.
70. Id. at 319–20 (noting the Court’s continually narrowing death penalty
jurisprudence—reserving it for the most serious of crimes deserving of such retribution—and the
lack of deterrence of future offenders with intellectual disability); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,
343, 348 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (requiring that a punishment further the goals of
deterrence or retribution); see also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (describing a death
penalty that neither deters nor seeks retribution as an unconstitutional punishment, one which
unnecessarily inflicts pain and suffering). But see Carol S. Steiker, Panetti v. Quarterman: Is There
A “Rational Understanding” of the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence?, 5 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 285, 292 (2007) (“[A] better understanding of the Court’s holdings is that retribution
alone is a necessary limit on the constitutional use of capital punishment. Indeed, it is hard to make
much sense of the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence without such an understanding.”).
71. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320–21 (highlighting such defendants’ propensity for false
confessions, inability to mitigate perceived aggravating factors of their crime, and ineffectiveness
as a witness and as a client); Caroline Everington & Solomon M. Fulero, Competence to Confess:
Measuring Understanding and Suggestibility of Defendants with Mental Retardation, 37 MENTAL
RETARDATION 212, 212–13 (1999) (noting the recent increase in death row exonerations along
with the fact that at least one of those was an intellectually disabled individual who confessed to a
crime he did not commit).
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recent state legislative determinations, and made clear that the Eighth
Amendment “places a substantive restriction on the State’s power to take
the life of [an intellectually disabled] offender.”72
Professional and medical communities alike praised the Atkins
decision—indeed, both the former American Association on Mental
Retardation (“AAMR,” renamed as the American Association on
Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, or “AAIDD”), and the
American Psychiatric Association (APA) contributed to amicus briefs in
the case.73 The dissenting opinions, however, lamented the majority’s
shift in the way it determined a national consensus existed.74 Experts
simultaneously opined that Atkins left too much latitude for states to
circumvent this new Eighth Amendment protection75 and also agonized
over the new rule “[leaving] nothing to the legislature with regard to the
public policy choices of crime and punishment.”76 As seen in the cases
below, the former analysis turned out to be more prescient than the
latter.77
2. Ex parte Briseno
Faced with a question coming under the Supreme Court’s rule in
Atkins, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas (CCA) created its own
rule in Ex parte Briseno to comply with the newest Eighth Amendment
prohibition.78 In Briseno, the CCA—the court of last resort for criminal
72. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (quotations omitted) (quoting Ford, 477 U.S. at 405); see also Ford,
477 U.S. at 405 (addressing whether the Constitution places a restriction on the State’s power to
take the life of an insane prisoner).
73. Mossman, supra note 55, at 263. Senior leaders from the AAMR and APA expressed
gratitude and relief at the decision, noting its importance regarding both the dignity of the individual
as well as the reliability of objective assessments by experienced professionals. Id.
74. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 324–26 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at 342–44 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); see also DeGrandis, supra note 48, at 848–50 (discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
specific rebuttal of the majority’s use of professional organizations, foreign law, and a misreading
of the objective factors for Eighth Amendment analysis, and also discussing Justice Scalia’s broad,
scathing rebuke of the majority’s personal beliefs leading to their own predetermined outcome).
75. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Atkins v. Virginia: Lessons from Substance and
Procedure in the Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 721, 732
(2008) (pointing out the possibility that Atkins’s reliance on Ford could in fact result in states
assuming “an unfettered license to defeat or marginalize the Eighth Amendment prohibition”).
76. DeGrandis, supra note 48, at 874 (discussing the Court’s decision in Atkins as an
overstepping of its constitutional boundaries).
77. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 75, at 731 (“Procedures dictate the scope of substantive
rights, and, in this context, the procedures adopted within various jurisdictions have the effect of
redefining the ‘consensus’ the Court identified. . . . Perhaps the Court’s willingness to cede to the
states the authority to craft procedures reflects its view that the substantive right extends only so
far—that there is no clear consensus beyond a prohibition against executing individuals with severe
and demonstrable manifestations of [intellectual disability].”).
78. Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Jose Garcia Briseno robbed and
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cases in Texas79—recognized the Texas legislature’s lack of action in
codifying the rule from Atkins, so it provided judicial guidelines for
dealing with such claims.80 The CCA looked to the most current clinical
manuals at the time, published by the APA and the AAMR, to evaluate
the spectrum of intellectually disabled individuals.81 The court stated it
must decide the “level and degree” of intellectual disability that a
consensus of Texans would agree should be exempt from the death
penalty.82
Not wishing to establish a hardline rule exempting all classes of
intellectually disabled individuals, the CCA opted instead to use current
medical definitions to help establish the legal definition of intellectual
disability.83 Viewing the medical criteria and standards as exceedingly
subjective, however, the CCA also implemented seven factors for the
factfinder to consider regarding adaptive behavior and functioning.84
Importantly, some of these factors specifically ask the factfinder to
consider the facts of the crime during the determination process. 85 This
diverges significantly from standardized criteria used by the professional
murdered a county sheriff, Ben Murray, in his home on January 5, 1991, and was sentenced to
death. Id. at 3. Shortly after Atkins, Briseno filed a habeas petition for relief, alleging he was
intellectually disabled. Id. After the trial court concluded that Briseno was not eligible for relief
based on the evidence presented, the CCA reviewed the record to make a final determination. Id.
at 3–4.
79. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 5.
80. Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 5.
81. Id.; see also AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 41–42 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-4] (describing four categories of
intellectual disability: mild, moderate, severe, and profound); AM. ASS’N ON MENTAL
RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF
SUPPORTS 5 (9th ed. 1992) [hereinafter AAMR-9] (defining intellectual disability as a disability
comprising significantly deficient intellectual functioning coupled with related limitations in
adaptive functioning, both of which occur before eighteen years old).
82. Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 6 (noting, for example, that most of Texas might agree that
the character Lennie, from John Steinbeck’s Of Mice and Men, should be exempt).
83. Id. at 6–7 (asserting that both the CCA and the Texas Health and Safety Code utilized similar
definitions based on that from the AAMR-9); see TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 591.003
(West 2017) (providing medical definitions of many terms, including “intellectual disability”).
84. Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8–9 (“Did those who knew the person best during the
developmental stage—his family, friends, teachers, employers, authorities—think he was
[intellectually disabled] at that time, and, if so, act in accordance with that determination? Has the
person formulated plans and carried them through or is his conduct impulsive? Does his conduct
show leadership or does it show that he is led around by others? Is his conduct in response to
external stimuli rational and appropriate, regardless of whether it is socially acceptable? Does he
respond coherently, rationally, and on point to oral or written questions or do his responses wander
from subject to subject? Can the person hide facts or lie effectively in his own or others’ interests?
Putting aside any heinousness or gruesomeness surrounding the capital offense, did the commission
of that offense require forethought, planning, and complex execution of purpose?”).
85. Id.; see Steiker & Steiker, supra note 75, at 727 (discussing how “[s]ome jurisdictions have
sought to weave the facts of the crime into the determination” process).
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community.86 These seven factors would become known as the Briseno
factors and will be discussed in greater detail later.
3. Hall v. Florida
Fourteen years after imposing the categorical ban against executing
intellectually disabled individuals, the Supreme Court decided Hall v.
Florida87 which asked whether, under Atkins, a state may require a strict
IQ threshold score to be met before allowing a defendant to present
further evidence of intellectual disability. 88 In 1978, Freddie Lee Hall
was sentenced to death for two murders.89 The Court had decided Atkins
while Hall was awaiting execution, so he filed a motion claiming he could
not be executed on account of his intellectual disability. 90 The State went
on to hear Hall’s evidence, including his IQ test results that had a range
of scores between seventy-one and eighty.91 The lower court found that
Hall could not be intellectually disabled as a matter of law, because
Florida required an IQ score of seventy or below before one could present
further evidence of intellectual disability. 92 The Florida Supreme Court
then affirmed this seventy-point threshold as constitutional.93
In its holding, the United States Supreme Court found that Florida’s
rigid IQ threshold disregarded established medical practice and created
an unconstitutional, “unacceptable risk” that intellectually disabled
individuals would be executed.94 Justice Kennedy, writing for the
majority, stated that the Florida rule disregarded the accepted margin for
the standard error of measurement (SEM) of IQ tests, which is an
objective fact in the scientific community. 95
Applying the Court’s rationale from Atkins,96 Justice Kennedy first
86. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 75, at 727 (noting the tests “depart[] from those employed
by professionals in the field”); DSM-4, supra note 81, at 46 (discussing the criteria for diagnosing
intellectual disability).
87. Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014).
88. Id. at 704.
89. Id. On February 21, 1978, Hall and an accomplice kidnapped, raped, and murdered Karol
Hurst. Id. Afterward, in a parking lot of a convenience store they were going to rob, Hall and his
accomplice killed sheriff’s deputy Lonnie Coburn. Id.
90. Id. at 707. Hall presented considerable evidence of intellectual disability, including IQ
scores and testimony from clinicians as well as his family. Id. at 706–07.
91. Id. at 707; see also Hall v. State, 109 So. 3d 704, 707 (Fla. 2012) (noting that Hall recorded
two IQ scores below seventy, but this information was excluded for evidentiary reasons).
92. Hall, 572 U.S. at 707; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137(1) (West 2013), invalidated by Hall, 572
U.S. 701.
93. Hall, 572 U.S. at 707; Hall, 109 So. 3d at 707.
94. Hall, 572 U.S. at 704.
95. Id. at 712–14.
96. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002) (“If the culpability of the average murderer
is insufficient to justify the most extreme sanction available to the State, the lesser culpability of
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considered how states may define intellectual disability.97 The majority
deemed it appropriate to discuss professional and psychiatric
communities’ assessments of IQ scores and their meaning, which would
lead to better understanding of state legislation, the lower court decisions,
and ultimately whether a national consensus had developed regarding the
issue.98 Kennedy further asserted that it was “proper” and “unsurprising”
for courts both to utilize and to be informed by experts in the medical
community when making determinations of intellectual disability. 99 He
also noted Florida’s statute on its face was not unconstitutional, and
indeed could be in tune with the medical community’s consensus. 100
However, the Florida Supreme Court interpreted it far too narrowly,
barring individuals with a score above seventy from presenting any
additional evidence of intellectual disability. 101
The Court held that Florida’s application of the rule disregarded
established medical practice in two ways: it relied on an IQ score as
conclusive evidence of intellectual capacity, and it failed to acknowledge
the inherent imprecision of that score.102 In addition, the Court cited a
significant majority of states that do account for the SEM in their own
implementations of Atkins, thereby providing “objective indicia of
society’s standards” with regard to the Eighth Amendment.103 The
majority also recognized the lack of definitive substantive or procedural
guides provided by Atkins, but averred that this did not grant “unfettered
discretion” to the states.104 Finally, the Court specifically gave credence
the [intellectually disabled] offender surely does not merit that form of retribution.”); Hall, 572
U.S. at 709 (noting again the importance of the fact that deterrent and retributive goals of capital
punishment not being met when levied on intellectually disabled offenders).
97. Hall, 572 U.S. at 709–10.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 710.
100. Id. at 711. This is because the statute itself did not explicitly preclude courts from taking
the SEM into account. Id. See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137(1) (West 2013) (defining intellectual
disability as “significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with
deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the period from conception to age 18”).
101. Hall, 572 U.S. at 711–12. Importantly, this goes against the clinical consensus that all
information regarding a person’s condition is probative of intellectual disability. Id.
102. Id. at 712–13 (“The professionals who design, administer, and interpret IQ tests have
agreed, for years now, that IQ test scores should be read not as a single fixed number but as a
range. . . . The SEM reflects the reality that an individual’s intellectual functioning cannot be
reduced to a single numerical score.”); see also R. MICHAEL FURR & VERNE R. BACHARACH,
PSYCHOMETRICS: AN INTRODUCTION 118 (2d ed. 2014) (describing the SEM of a test as a
statistical fact and paramount to the theory of measurement itself).
103. Hall, 572 U.S. at 714 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563 (2005)). Kennedy’s
argument took many forms to create this majority. In the end, he cited the fact that every state
legislature, other than Virginia, that considered the Atkins rule, and every state court that has
interpreted those legislatures’ laws had taken a stance inapposite to Florida’s. See id. at 718.
104. Id. at 718–19. Indeed, Kennedy argues, if the states could define intellectual disability with
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to the medical community, claiming decisions such as this one must be
guided by their diagnostic framework and informed assessments.105
The holding in Hall dealt specifically with IQ test scores, which
correlate with intellectual functioning, the first prong of analysis for
intellectual disability under Atkins.106 Notably, in the time leading up to
Hall, roughly thirty-one percent of Atkins claims were rejected solely on
this prong.107 Contrasting this with only twelve percent of such claims
failing on prong two (adaptive functioning) shows that the IQ test
problem confronted by Hall was of critical importance.108 Many of these
cases involved issues similar to those addressed in Hall: strict IQ score
cutoffs at seventy,109 failure to account for widely accepted concepts such
as SEM,110 and the use of scores based in clinically unacceptable or
scientifically invalid methods.111 Critically, the rule in Hall opened the
complete autonomy, the protection that Atkins guarantees would become null. Id. at 720.
105. Id. at 723. Simply put, it is not medically sound judgment to use a single test as dispositive
when performing a conjunctive analysis of one’s intellectual capabilities. See also AM.
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 37 (5th
ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-5] (“[A] person with an IQ score above 70 may have such severe
adaptive behavior problems . . . that the person’s actual functioning is comparable to that of
individuals with a lower IQ score.”).
106. Hall, 572 U.S. at 710. Both Hall and Atkins utilized the same three-prong approach to
define and analyze intellectual disability. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308 n.3 (2002)
(discussing the APA’s definition of intellectual disability, specifically intellectual functioning);
DSM-5, supra note 105, at 33 (explaining the diagnostic criteria for intellectual disability).
107. See John H. Blume et al., A Tale of Two (and Possibly Three) Atkins: Intellectual
Disability and Capital Punishment Twelve Years After the Supreme Court’s Creation of A
Categorical Bar, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 393, 400–01 (2014) (noting that fifty-two percent
of all losing Atkins claims failed all three prongs of the test, while thirty-one percent of all losing
Atkins claims had failed on the first prong alone).
108. Id. at 401 (noting the small number of cases that failed on prong two).
109. Id. at 402–03 (discussing how certain claimants who lost should have prevailed if not for
the strict IQ cutoff of seventy); see, e.g., Parrish v. Commonwealth, 272 S.W.3d 161, 168 (Ky.
2008); Cribbs v. State, No. W2006-01381-CCA-R3-PD, 2009 WL 1905454, at *37–38 (Tenn.
Crim. App. July 1, 2009).
110. Blume et al., supra note 107, at 402 (discussing how the court “failed to account for
clinically accepted concepts such as . . . SEM”); see, e.g., Hall, 572 U.S. at 712–13.
111. Blume et al., supra note 107, at 402–03 (explaining how the court erred in its assessment
by “credit[ing] scores derived from clinically unacceptable methods”); see, e.g., Henderson v.
Director, No. 1:06-CV-507, 2013 WL 4811223, at *9 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 6, 2013) (asserting that the
State’s expert testified that the highest IQ score is the most reliable based on spurious conjecture),
vacated, Henderson v. Davis, 868 F.3d 314 (5th Cir. 2017); Anderson v. State, 163 S.W.3d 333,
355–56 (Ark. 2004) (using a short questionnaire to acquire a rough IQ score and accepting expert
testimony that deduced an estimated IQ range from scores on a test that was not explicitly designed
to measure IQ); State v. Were, 890 N.E.2d 263, 293 (Ohio 2008) (rejecting petitioner’s Atkins
claim, which included an IQ score of sixty-nine, based on expert testimony averring the test scores
should be adjusted because minorities’ IQ scores are skewed by “cultural bias”); Lizcano v. State,
No. AP-75,879, 2010 WL 1817772, at *11 (Tex. Crim. App. May 5, 2010) (explaining that the
State’s expert’s IQ scores were properly adjusted higher because Hispanics generally score 7.5
points lower than Caucasians because of cultural differences rather than actual cognitive
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door for future litigants to bring Eighth Amendment challenges against
outdated methodologies for implementing the death penalty and not only
because it was the Court’s first direct reconsideration of Atkins.112 And
so arose the circumstances for the Supreme Court to hear such a challenge
in Moore v. Texas.113
II. MOORE V. TEXAS
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the CCA for Moore v. Texas,
an appeal from the CCA’s denial of relief to Bobby James Moore after he
challenged his death sentence under Atkins and Hall.114 This Part
proceeds with a summary of the facts and procedural history of Moore’s
case, as well as with a discussion of the majority opinion and Chief
Justice Roberts’s dissent.115
A. Facts and Procedural History in the Lower Courts
On April 25, 1980, Moore shot and killed James McCarble during a
botched robbery in Houston, Texas.116 Two months later, Moore was
convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death.117 In 1995, a federal
habeas court vacated Moore’s sentence based on ineffective trial

deficiencies).
112. See Bidish J. Sarma, How Hall v. Florida Transforms the Supreme Court’s Eighth
Amendment Evolving Standards of Decency Analysis, 62 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 186, 195
(2014) (discussing how the Court’s Eighth Amendment approach in Hall allows litigants to present
new constitutional challenges to outdated methodologies); see also James W. Ellis, Hall v. Florida:
The Supreme Court’s Guidance in Implementing Atkins, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 383, 390–
91 (2014) (concluding that the Court’s new analysis includes a consensus of professionals in the
field, not just the states, and that states can no longer freely ignore the scientific community);
Christopher Slobogin, Scientizing Culpability: The Implications of Hall v. Florida and the
Possibility of A “Scientific Stare Decisis”, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 415, 417 (2014) (labeling
the Hall decision radical in its logical and scientific underpinnings).
113. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Lessons for Law Reform from the American
Experiment with Capital Punishment, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 764–65, 765 n.132 (2014) (taking
note of the Briseno factors and the CCA’s dubious belief that not all intellectually disabled persons
have the requisite diminished culpability to exempt them from the death penalty).
114. See Moore v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2407 (2016) (mem.) (granting certiorari).
115. See supra Part I.A (discussing the Eighth Amendment generally and what it means today);
infra Part I.B (explaining the categorical ban from Atkins, how it was implemented in Texas by Ex
parte Briseno, and how it was fine-tuned by Hall).
116. Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1054 (2017) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Moore and two
others decided to rob a market in Houston for money to make their car payments. The three men
entered the store and confronted two employees, prompting one of them to scream. Moore then
shot the other employee, killing him instantly. Id.
117. Id. at 1044 (majority opinion); see also Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 492 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2015) (noting that Moore was convicted of capital murder by a jury and sentenced to death
based on the jury’s answers to special issues in its verdict).
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counsel,118 which was upheld on appeal by the Fifth Circuit.119 At
resentencing in 2001, however, Moore was again sentenced to death.120
After Atkins, Moore sought habeas relief from his death sentence once
more, this time in state court, by asserting exemption from the death
sentence because he was intellectually disabled.121 In a two-day
evidentiary hearing, the habeas court heard evidence detailing Moore’s
purported intellectual disability.122 In its evaluation, the habeas court
considered the current medical diagnostic standards, including the fifth
edition of the APA’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM-5) and the eleventh edition of the AAIDD clinical
manual (AAIDD-11).123 The court used the three accepted criteria for
diagnosing intellectual disability: intellectual functioning deficits,
adaptive deficits, and the onset of said deficits while the person was a
minor.124 Based on Moore’s IQ scores and expert testimony, the court
determined Moore exhibited below average intellectual functioning as
well as significant adaptive deficits, and submitted a recommendation
either to reduce Moore’s sentence to life in prison or grant him a new
trial.125
The CCA, as the ultimate factfinder,126 rejected the habeas court’s
recommendations and subsequently denied relief to Moore after its own

118. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1044–45; see also Moore v. Collins, No. H-93-3217, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22859, at *34–35 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 1995) (addressing the egregious conduct and gross
mishandling of Moore’s case by his trial counsel that jeopardized his life and liberty, virtually
guaranteeing a death sentence).
119. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1045; Moore v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 586, 622 (5th Cir. 1999).
120. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1045; Moore v. State, No. 74,059, 2004 WL 231323, at *1 (Tex. Crim.
App. Jan. 14, 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 931 (2004).
121. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1044–45.
122. Id. at 1045 (including social and mental difficulties, understanding of days of the week,
and knowledge of basic math).
123. Id.; DSM-5, supra note 105 (detailed manual classifying mental disorders); AM. ASS’N ON
INTELLECTUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: DEFINITION,
CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS (11th ed. 2010) [hereinafter AAIDD-11].
124. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1045; see also AAIDD-11, supra note 123, at 27 (noting intellectual
functioning deficits are signified in part by an IQ score of seventy, or two standard deviations from
the general population average after adjusting for the standard error of measurement); Hall v.
Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 710 (2014) (describing adaptive deficits as “the inability to learn basic skills
and adjust behavior to changing circumstances”).
125. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1045–46. The habeas court took six of Moore’s IQ scores into its
account, resulting in an average score of 70.66. The court also credited expert testimony which led
to a determination of significant adaptive deficits. Id. See also AAIDD-11, supra note 123, at 43
(noting performance in three adaptive skill sets—conceptual, social, and practical—must be two
standard deviations below the average to be considered significant).
126. See Ex parte Reed, 271 S.W.3d 698, 727 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (noting Texas’s forty
years of established jurisprudence with the CCA acting as final finder of fact in habeas
proceedings).
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review of the record.127 The CCA then reaffirmed Ex parte Briseno,128
which it continued to use to determine intellectual disability for death
penalty cases.129 Importantly, the CCA also supported the seven
subjective evidentiary factors from Briseno as compliant with Hall’s
directive that a court’s criteria be adequately informed by the medical
community’s diagnostic framework.130 Accordingly, the CCA utilized
Briseno’s implementation of terms and definitions from the AAMR-9,
published twenty-three years prior in 1992.131 The CCA went on to reject
the results of five out of Moore’s seven IQ tests as unreliable and only
reviewed his scores of seventy-four and seventy-eight.132 Next, the CCA
disregarded the lower end of the standard error of measurement for his
score of seventy-four, citing adverse circumstances as well as Moore’s
“withdrawn and depressive behavior.”133 With significant intellectual
functioning deficits thus not found, the CCA moved on to hold that
Moore also did not show sufficient inadequacies in adaptive
functioning.134 Finally, the CCA looked to the seven Briseno factors and
determined they also supported a finding of no intellectual disability for
Moore.135
One judge on the CCA dissented, arguing that the rules from Atkins
and Hall would mandate that they use the most current medical standards

127. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1046.
128. See supra Part I.B.2 for a discussion of the holding and rationale from Ex parte Briseno,
135 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
129. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1046; Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 486–87 (Tex. Crim. App.
2015) (holding the habeas court in error for using current AAIDD standards in lieu of Briseno,
which, it ruled, should hold its place as primary guidance for intellectual disability in capital cases
unless and until the Texas legislature acts to modify the standards for such cases).
130. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1047; Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 487; see also Hall v. Florida,
572 U.S. 701, 721 (2014) (“The legal determination of intellectual disability is distinct from a
medical diagnosis, but it is informed by the medical community’s diagnostic framework.”).
131. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1046; Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 486–87; see also Ex parte
Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 7.
132. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1047; see also Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 518–19 (discrediting
four of the IQ tests for being noncomprehensive screening tests, group tests, or neuropsychological
tests, and discrediting a fifth due to testimony of “suboptimal effort” on that test).
133. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1047; see also Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 519 (“[H]e was on
death row and facing the prospect of execution, and he had exhibited withdrawn and depressive
behavior. These considerations might tend to place his actual IQ in a somewhat higher portion of
that 69 to 79 range.”).
134. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1047; Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 520. The experts agreed that
Moore’s adaptive-functioning fell well below the mean, but the State’s experts discounted these
findings because Moore was judged based on tasks he had no prior experience with, such as writing
a check. The CCA sided with the State’s expert’s opinion, giving greater weight to Moore’s
adaptive strengths exhibited while living on the streets and in prison. Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d
at 521–25.
135. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1047–48; Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 526–27.
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to make decisions about intellectual disability. 136 The dissent also
scrutinized Briseno as outdated and out of touch with both the medical
community and society at large.137 Under these circumstances, the
Supreme Court granted Moore’s petition for certiorari to answer whether
the CCA’s adherence to superseded medical standards and its reliance on
Ex parte Briseno were allowed by the Eighth Amendment.138
B. The Court’s Opinion
Although the Court’s rule from Atkins left it up to states to create their
own guidelines for determining intellectual disability in capital cases,
Hall clarified that states are not given unfettered discretion to disregard
established medical practice when creating those guidelines.139
Accordingly, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Moore majority held that
states may not disregard or diminish the force of the medical
community’s consensus, and that the nonclinical Briseno factors “creat[e]
an unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual disability will be
executed.”140
The Court recalled its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, noting that it
protects and respects the dignity of all people141 and that it must continue
to evolve along with the standards of decency in the ongoing
development of society.142 These principles of decency and the
maturation of society eventually led to the decision in Atkins.143 Hall built
upon the rule from Atkins, and the Court in Moore continued Hall’s
trajectory by narrowing the judicial playing field on which states can
comply with the Eighth Amendment in death penalty determinations.144
136. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1048; Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 530.
137. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1048; Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 529–30.
138. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1048.
139. Id.; Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 712 (2014); see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
317 (2002) (leaving it up to the states to create appropriate means to enforce the ban on the death
penalty for intellectually disabled persons).
140. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1044 (alteration in original) (quoting Hall, 572 U.S. at 704).
141. Id. at 1048; see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005) (“By protecting even
those convicted of heinous crimes, the Eighth Amendment reaffirms the duty of the government to
respect the dignity of all persons.”).
142. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1048; see also Hall, 572 U.S. at 708 (“To enforce the Constitution’s
protection of human dignity, this Court looks to the ‘evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.’” (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958))).
143. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1048 (noting the national consensus against the practice of executing
intellectually disabled individuals).
144. Id. at 1049 (“Hall indicated that being informed by the medical community does not
demand adherence to everything stated in the latest medical guide. But neither does our precedent
license disregard of current medical standards. The CCA’s conclusion that Moore’s IQ scores
established that he is not intellectually disabled is irreconcilable with Hall.”); see also Hall, 572
U.S. at 721 (“In addition to the views of the States and the Court’s precedent, this determination is
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The majority explained that its precedent required courts to consider
the standard error of measurement when evaluating an individual’s IQ
scores.145 The CCA’s failure to do so put its judgment at odds with
Hall,146 because a person’s intellectual functioning cannot simply be
boiled down to one score.147 The CCA acknowledged Moore’s score of
seventy-four and its SEM range of sixty-nine to seventy-nine, but
incorrectly credited other factors from the test to reject the lower end of
that range.148 Instead of accepting the SEM range and considering the
second prong of intellectual disability—adaptive functioning—the CCA
determined that Moore was not intellectually disabled based solely on its
analysis of intellectual functioning.149 Indeed, the recognition and likely
existence of person-specific imprecisions with an IQ test cannot be used
to limit the SEM range of the test itself.150 The Court explained it was not
drawing a line in the proverbial sand wherein the Eighth Amendment will
be invoked at one IQ score and not another.151 Here, as the majority
noted, the Court was sharpening the rule from Hall, again disallowing the
use of IQ score as a strict cutoff.152 Further, it required courts to proceed

informed by the views of medical experts. These views do not dictate the Court’s decision, yet the
Court does not disregard these informed assessments. . . . The legal determination of intellectual
disability is distinct from a medical diagnosis, but it is informed by the medical community’s
diagnostic framework.”).
145. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1049; see Hall, 572 U.S. at 723 (noting that the standard error of
measurement of a test is a statistical fact and holding that a defendant must be allowed to present
further evidence of intellectual disability when his or her test score falls within that range); see also
Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2278 (2015) (finding it unreasonable to use an IQ test score of
seventy-five to disqualify an individual from being found intellectually disabled).
146. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1049.
147. Id.; see also Hall, 572 U.S. at 713 (“For purposes of most IQ tests, the SEM means that an
individual’s score is best understood as a range of scores on either side of the recorded score.”).
148. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1049; see also Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 519 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2015) (“[Moore’s] score range on the WAIS–R [IQ test] is between 69 and 79. As with the
WISC [IQ test score], the fact that [Moore] took a now-outmoded version of the WAIS–R might
tend to place his actual IQ score in a somewhat lower portion of that 69 to 79 range. However, by
the time he took the WAIS–R, [Moore] had a history of academic failure, something that his own
expert stated could adversely affect effort. [Moore] also took the WAIS–R under adverse
circumstances; he was on death row and facing the prospect of execution, and he had exhibited
withdrawn and depressive behavior. These considerations might tend to place his actual IQ in a
somewhat higher portion of that 69 to 79 range. Considering these factors together, we find no
reason to doubt that applicant’s WAIS–R score accurately and fairly represented his intellectual
functioning as being above the intellectually disabled range.” (citations omitted)).
149. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1049 (“Because the lower end of Moore’s score range falls at or below
70, the CCA had to move on to consider Moore’s adaptive functioning.”).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1050.
152. Id.; see also Hall, 572 U.S. at 712 (“Florida’s rule disregards established medical
practice in two interrelated ways. It takes an IQ score as final and conclusive evidence of a
defendant’s intellectual capacity, when experts in the field would consider other evidence. It also
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with a legitimate inquiry into intellectual disability and adaptive
functioning when one’s SEM-adjusted score is within the clinically
established range for intellectual functioning deficits.153
Next, in reviewing the CCA’s evaluation of adaptive functioning, the
majority found once again that the lower court had strayed from current
medical and clinical standards.154 The CCA erred in giving too much
weight to Moore’s perceived adaptive strengths, rather than focusing on
adaptive deficits as the current literature instructs.155 The Court also
noted its own jurisprudence that has emphasized deficits more than
strengths.156 Moreover, according to the majority, the added importance
that the CCA placed on Moore’s improvements in prison was also
misguided, because the professional community strongly cautions against
relying on evidence of adaptive functioning gleaned from such controlled
settings.157
In addition to its overemphasis on adaptive strengths, the Court held
that the CCA erred in determining Moore’s intellectual and adaptive
deficits were unrelated as a result of traumas from his youth. 158 In so
doing, the CCA again disregarded the clinical consensus, which notes that
experiences such as abuse and academic failure are actually risk factors
for intellectual disability.159 Lastly, the Court found it improper for the
CCA to require that Moore show his adaptive deficits were unrelated to

relies on a purportedly scientific measurement of the defendant’s abilities, his IQ score, while
refusing to recognize that the score is, on its own terms, imprecise.”).
153. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1050.
154. Id.
155. Id.; see also Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 522–23 (Tex. Crim App. 2015) (noting that
Moore was able to adapt to life on the streets by hustling at pool halls and mowing lawns for money,
and using these strengths to outweigh factors showing adaptive deficits); AAIDD-11, supra note
123, at 47 (asserting that even significant deficits in conceptual, social, and practical skills are not
completely offset by potential adaptive strengths); DSM-5, supra note 105, at 33 (emphasizing that
the inquiry into adaptive skills should center around adaptive deficits).
156. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1050; see also Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2281 (2015)
(“[I]ntellectually disabled persons may have ‘strengths in social or physical capabilities, strengths
in some adaptive skill areas, or strengths in one aspect of an adaptive skill in which they otherwise
show an overall limitation.’” (quoting AM. ASS’N OF MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL
RETARDATION, DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 8 (10th ed. 2002))).
157. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1050; see also DSM-5, supra note 105, at 38 (stressing that adaptive
functioning is difficult to accurately gauge in a controlled setting such as prison); AM. ASS’N ON
INTELLECTUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, USER’S GUIDE: TO ACCOMPANY THE 11TH
EDITION OF INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF
SUPPORTS 20 (2012) [hereinafter AAIDD-11 USER’S GUIDE] (advising specifically to avoid relying
on behavior in prison when assessing adaptive functioning).
158. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1051; Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 488.
159. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1051; see also AAIDD-11, supra note 123, at 59–60 (noting that at
least one of these risk factors will be present in every case of intellectual disability).
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any personality disorder,160 and again pointed to the current medical
consensus, which maintains that these conditions can coexist and
oftentimes do.161
Looking next to the CCA’s Briseno factors, the Court held that they
are in stark dissonance with Hall and create an unacceptable risk of
intellectually disabled persons being executed.162 Moore explained that
those who have a mild intellectual disability, whom Texans might believe
should not be exempt from the death penalty, are likely to be shut out by
Briseno’s subjective factors. But, the Court held, those individuals should
still be protected by the guarantee of Atkins and cannot be scrutinized
under rules that wholly invalidate that protection.163 According to the
Court, the Briseno factors comprise the opinions and stereotypes of
laypersons and hold no basis in medical or clinical understanding of the
intellectually disabled.164 Furthermore, the factors are out of touch with
the rest of the nation: no state legislature had approved anything like them
and they had been implemented only twice by other states in twelve
years.165 Finally, Texas itself does not follow Briseno or its rationale in
160. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1051; Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 488; see also Ex parte Moore,
470 S.W.3d at 526 (asserting that Moore’s difficulties as a child were probably emotional rather
than intellectual).
161. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1051; see also DSM-5, supra note 105, at 40 (describing these mental,
physical, and medical conditions as frequently coexisting with intellectual disability, with some
conditions occurring at a rate four times greater than in the general population); Brief of Amici
Curiae American Psychological Association et al. in Support of Petitioner at 19, Moore, 137 S. Ct.
1039 (No. 15-797) (“The existence of a personality disorder or other mental health issue is
emphatically not evidence that a person does not also have intellectual disability.”).
162. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1051–52; see also Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 704 (2014)
(recognizing Florida’s “rigid rule” “creates an unacceptable risk that persons with an intellectual
disability will be executed”).
163. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1051–52; see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563–64 (2005)
(pointing out that Atkins disallowed the death penalty for the entire class of intellectually disabled
defendants); Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (“We, however, must
define that level and degree of [intellectual disability] at which a consensus of Texas citizens would
agree that a person should be exempted from the death penalty.”).
164. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1051–52; see also AAIDD-11 USER’S GUIDE, supra note 157, at 25–
27 (noting the medical community’s constant battle against public perceptions and stereotypes
about intellectual disability); Brief of Amici Curiae, the American Association on Intellectual and
Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD), and the Arc of the United States, in Support of Petitioner at
13, Moore, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (No. 15-797) (“These lay assumptions sometimes include an imagined
‘list’ of things that people with intellectual disability cannot do. The activities that are supposedly
inconsistent with intellectual disability can involve, for example, employment, social relationships,
reading and writing, and driving a car. But the clinical literature is abundantly clear that many of
the people who have been properly diagnosed with intellectual disability can perform one or more
of these tasks.”).
165. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1052; see also Commonwealth v. Bracey, 117 A.3d 270, 286–87 (Pa.
2015) (noting the use of the Briseno factors is allowed but not mandated as part of the intellectual
disability inquiry); Howell v. State, No. W2009-02426-CCA-R3-PD, 2011 WL 2420378, at *18
(Tenn. Crim. App. June 14, 2011) (labeling the adaptive behavior criteria as exceedingly subjective
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any context other than death penalty cases—juveniles in the Texas
criminal justice system are to be evaluated by the most recent edition of
the DSM, and students in Texas’s school systems are not assessed for
intellectual disability per the relatedness requirement as they are in
Briseno.166
The Court concluded by emphasizing that states do not have complete
flexibility to enforce the guarantee of Atkins.167 Indeed, as Hall pointed
out, if this were true then Atkins might as well be void.168 As such,
pointing to the importance of being informed by current medical
diagnostic standards, the Court abrogated the rule from Briseno, vacated
the judgment of the CCA, and remanded for further proceedings.169
C. Chief Justice Roberts’s Dissent
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, dissented,
arguing the CCA did not err in concluding that Moore was not
intellectually disabled based on below average intellectual functioning,
and therefore would affirm the lower court’s decision.170 Roberts
conceded that the Briseno factors are unacceptable for use in analyzing
adaptive deficits and cannot be used to implement the protections of
Atkins.171 However, the use of these factors had no bearing on the CCA’s
proper—in his opinion—assessment of intellectual functioning, and so its
ruling should remain undisturbed.172
Roberts argued that the majority was straying from the Court’s “usual
mode of analysis” in cases involving the Eighth Amendment.173
Historically, the Court has typically looked to “objective indicia of
society’s standards” as reflected by the states to craft new constitutional
rules.174 Here, Roberts was concerned with the majority’s near-total
and listing six of the seven Briseno factors for post-conviction habeas courts to use in weighing
evidence of intellectual disability).
166. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1052; 37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 380.8751(e)(3) (2018); see also 19
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 89.1040(c)(5) (2018) (defining students with intellectual disabilities).
167. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1052–53; see also Hall, 572 U.S. at 719 (“Atkins did not give the
States unfettered discretion to define the full scope of the constitutional protection.”).
168. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1053; see also Hall, 572 U.S. at 720–21 (“If the States were to have
complete autonomy to define intellectual disability as they wished, the Court’s decision in Atkins
could become a nullity, and the Eighth Amendment’s protection of human dignity would not
become a reality.”).
169. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1053.
170. Id. at 1053 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1054 (quoting Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 714 (2014)); see also Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551, 563 (2005) (noting that the Court has historically considered that legislative
enactments and state practice are expressions of society’s standards); Hall, 572 U.S. at 714
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dependence on a medical consensus, rather than the national consensus
that is traditionally relied upon to suss out the meanings of the Eighth
Amendment.175
Chief Justice Roberts further disagreed with the majority, as he
believed the CCA’s holding properly construed the rules of both Atkins
and Hall.176 First, according to Roberts, the CCA appropriately enforced
Atkins by creating its own intellectual disability guidelines in Briseno and
following them as binding precedent.177 Next, the CCA evaluated its
three-pronged definition of intellectual disability and applied the rule
from Briseno in light of the Court’s recent decision in Hall.178 To do so,
Roberts emphasized, the CCA was forced to square the Briseno
definition—drawn from the AAMR-9—with the most recent clinical
manuals, the AAIDD-11 and DSM-5.179 However, and quite importantly
in Roberts’s view, these two manuals include conflicting direction on
whether intellectual disability requires that adaptive deficits be related to
intellectual functioning.180 As such, Roberts argued, it was impossible for
the CCA to stay in line with both clinical manuals in order to remain
“adequately informed by the medical communit[y].”181
(reasoning that “objective indicia” exist when a “significant majority” of states acknowledge error
inherent in IQ test scores).
175. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1054 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[C]linicians, not judges, should
determine clinical standards; and judges, not clinicians, should determine the content of the Eighth
Amendment. Today’s opinion confuses those roles . . . .”); see also Stephen McAllister, DeathPenalty Symposium: A Court Increasingly Uncomfortable with the Death Penalty, SCOTUSBLOG
(June 29, 2017, 4:32 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/death-penalty-symposium-courtincreasingly-uncomfortable-death-penalty (describing the Court as playing doctor more than it was
interpreting the law).
176. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1054–55 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 1054 (noting the habeas court erred by diverging from established precedent and the
CCA was right to rebuke it for doing so); see also Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 252–53
(1998) (“Our decisions remain binding precedent until we see fit to reconsider them, regardless of
whether subsequent cases have raised doubts about their continuing vitality.”); Bosse v. Oklahoma,
137 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2016) (admonishing the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals for taking it upon
itself to assume the Supreme Court’s precedent was outdated).
178. Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 486 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); see also Moore, 137 S. Ct.
at 1055 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (laying out the three facets of intellectual disability from Briseno:
sub-average intellectual functioning coupled with related deficits in adaptive functioning that begin
before the age of eighteen).
179. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1055 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
180. Id.; see also AAMR-9, supra note 81, at 5 (defining intellectual disability as the
combination of below average intellectual functioning accompanied by related limitations in
adaptive functioning occurring before the individual is eighteen years old); compare AAIDD-11,
supra note 123, at 5 (defining intellectual disability as the combination of substantial deficits in
intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior originating before the age of eighteen), with DSM5, supra note 105, at 38 (stressing one’s adaptive functioning deficits must “be directly related to
intellectual impairments” in order to satisfy the criteria for intellectual disability (emphasis added)).
181. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1055 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting
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Next, Roberts argued that the CCA correctly and properly analyzed
Moore’s intellectual functioning based on scores from two IQ tests.182 In
his view, it was within the CCA’s authority to consider evidence and
testimony surrounding Moore’s IQ tests and to use that evidence to
discount the lower range of the SEM.183 While the majority found this
determination by the CCA to be incompatible with Hall, Roberts differed,
asserting that Hall stands against bright-line IQ thresholds for intellectual
disability determinations and does not hold that courts must strictly
adhere to SEM ranges.184 Roberts contended that the majority’s opinion
could only be justified by “absolute conformity” to medical standards,
and that by fastening the Eighth Amendment to a one-point difference in
IQ scores, the majority here was just as wrong as the Florida Supreme
Court was in Hall.185
Finally, by looking to clinical practitioners for guidance, the Chief
Justice asserted that the majority had again strongly diverged from the
Court’s traditional jurisprudence.186 The determination of what is cruel
Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 487); see also Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 721 (2014) (explaining
that the views of medical experts inform, but are not dispositive of, the Court’s opinion).
182. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1055 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
183. Id. “The court went on to consider additional expert testimony about potential factors
affecting that score [of seventy-four]. Based on that evidence, the CCA discounted portions of the
SEM-generated range and concluded that Moore’s IQ did not lie in the relevant range for
intellectual disability.” Id. at 1060.
184. Id. (“Hall provided no definitive guidance on this sort of approach [taken by the CCA
here]: recognizing the inherent imprecision of IQ tests, but considering additional evidence to
determine whether an SEM-generated range of scores accurately reflected a prisoner’s actual IQ.”).
185. Id. at 1061. Roberts also noted that clinicians would not always hold up the SEM as the
only way to determine the range of possible IQ scores for an individual. Id. See, e.g., Gilbert S.
Macvaugh III & Mark D. Cunningham, Atkins v. Virginia: Implications and Recommendations for
Forensic Practice, 37 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 131, 147 (2009) (“Error in intellectual assessment is not
solely a function [of the SEM]. Other sources of error or assessment imprecision may involve the
examinee . . . . Such factors include the mental and physical health, mood, effort, and motivation
of the examinee during testing . . . .”); AAIDD-11, supra note 123, at 100–01 (“When considering
the relative weight or degree of confidence given to any assessment instrument, the clinician needs
to consider . . . the conditions under which the test(s) was/were given [and] . . . the standard error
of measurement . . . .”).
186. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1057–58 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (pointing to the Hall decision just
three years prior when the Court found it paramount to evaluate state practices and determine
whether there was a consensus); see also Brief of the States of Arizona et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondent at 8, Moore, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (No. 15-797) (“Viewed correctly, i.e., focusing
on Texas’ use of intellectual disability criteria consistent with those relied upon by this Court in
Atkins, it becomes clear that Texas is not an ‘outlier,’ but rather stands among the overwhelming
majority of death penalty States that have declined to adopt medical associations’ latest criteria for
diagnosing intellectual disability.”); Dominic Draye, Death-Penalty Symposium: Evolving
Standards for “Evolving Standards”, SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2017, 2:52 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/symposium-evolving-standards-evolving-standards/
(pointing out the majority opinion’s single mention of state legislatures coupled with its disregard
of a sixteen-state amicus brief that argued Moore’s request for relief was inconsistent with the
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and unusual, and thus forbidden by the Eighth Amendment, is a reflection
of “societal standards of decency, not a medical assessment of clinical
practice.”187 Roberts was ultimately troubled by the majority’s seeming
refusal to acknowledge the practice of the states in coming to its
conclusion.188
In sum, Chief Justice Roberts opposed the majority’s decision as an
unjustified expansion of the rule from Hall.189 Notwithstanding the
aptness or clinical accuracy shown by the CCA’s evidentiary conclusion,
Roberts maintained that the reasons presented in favor of holding them
in error here were not sufficient.190 The Court could not point to any
national legislative consensus justifying this constitutional holding, so
Roberts argued there was no support for this ruling other than the
subjective views of individual justices.191
III. THE COURT’S CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL CONSENSUS
REVIEW IN MOORE APPROPRIATELY PROTECTS INTELLECTUALLY
DISABLED INDIVIDUALS FROM CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
By expanding the scope of protection under Atkins with its ruling in
Moore, the Supreme Court continued its recent trend of using national
consensus coupled with professional guidance to enable the Eighth
Amendment to evolve and mature with national standards of decency.
This Part first establishes that the Court’s holding in Moore properly
followed its own Eighth Amendment precedents.192 Next, this Part
demonstrates the importance of adhering to current medical and clinical
guidelines when determining intellectual disability in death penalty
cases,193 and discusses the flaw in the dissent’s argument that the
professional community is splintered.194 Finally, this Part explains why
states’ consensus).
187. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1058 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also DSM-5, supra note 105, at
25 (stating the purpose of the guide is to assist in clinical assessment and treatment planning, while
pointing out the information provided does not always perfectly align with questions of crucial
importance to the law).
188. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1058 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 312 (2002) (holding that the most reliable objective evidence of the nation’s standards of
decency is reflected in the states’ practices).
189. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1061 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
190. Id.
191. Id. (pointing out there was no argument from Moore nor any assertion from the majority
as to a national consensus on the practices at issue); see also Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592
(1977) (“To this end, attention must be given to the public attitudes concerning a particular sentence
history and precedent, legislative attitudes, and the response of juries reflected in their sentencing
decisions are to be consulted.”).
192. See infra notes 196, 203.
193. See infra note 212.
194. See infra note 227.
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the Court was correct in abrogating Texas’s rule from Ex parte Briseno,
which was irreconcilable with both Hall and Atkins.195
While clinical determination is indeed not analogous to legal
determination, using outdated and nonclinical diagnostic criteria
nonetheless disregards the established professional and clinical
consensus, and it certainly does not comport with Hall.196 The CCA
violated established practice in its reliance on outdated reference
materials and its failure to apply the proper and accepted standards.197
The criteria for evaluating intellectual disability evolve based on
academic and clinical progress in science and medicine.198 Despite these
advances and attendant increased understanding, Texas continued to
utilize the AAMR-9, published in 1992, to aid in its legal determination
of intellectual disability. 199 Next, the CCA ignored professional criteria
by effectively shutting off the inquiry into Moore’s intellectual disability
based solely on his IQ scores.200 Hall warned against basing one’s
determination solely on IQ test results.201 The CCA was flawed not only
in its sole reliance on IQ score in comparison to clinical consensus, but
also in its dismissal of the widely recognized SEM for the test.202
Clinical determination of intellectual disability hinges on adaptive
deficits, which cannot be overshadowed in a legal determination by other

195. See infra note 238.
196. Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological Association et al. in Support of Petitioner,
supra note 161, at 14; see also Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 712 (2014) (striking down Florida’s
rule that “disregard[ed] established medical practice” for the consideration of intellectual
functioning).
197. Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological Association et al. in Support of Petitioner,
supra note 161, at 14.
198. Id.; see also DSM-5, supra note 105, at 6–7 (summarizing the revision process and how
changes to diagnostic criteria address specific strengths and weaknesses of the old methodology);
AAIDD-11, supra note 123, at xiv–xvi (articulating the organization’s mission to build upon a
constantly developing body of knowledge that reflects the changed construct of disability).
199. Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological Association et al. in Support of Petitioner,
supra note 161, at 15; AAMR-9, supra note 81; see also Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 486
(Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (concluding that, in the absence of legislation implementing Atkins, the
court would continue to follow the 1992 text).
200. Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological Association et al. in Support of Petitioner,
supra note 161, at 15–16; see also Hall, 572 U.S. at 722 (“An IQ score is an approximation, not a
final and infallible assessment of intellectual functioning.”).
201. Hall, 572 U.S. at 723 (“It is not sound to view a single factor as dispositive of a conjunctive
and interrelated assessment.”); Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological Association et al. in
Support of Petitioner, supra note 161, at 15; see also DSM-5, supra note 105, at 37 (“[A] person
with an IQ score above 70 may have such severe adaptive behavior problems . . . that the person’s
actual functioning is comparable to that of individuals with a lower IQ score.”).
202. Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological Association et al. in Support of Petitioner,
supra note 161, at 16; see also AAIDD-11, supra note 123, at 35–36 (discussing how to properly
utilize SEM).
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factors.203 Hall recognized the importance of this second prong of
intellectual disability and how it must be analyzed in conjunction with
intellectual functioning.204 In fact, the inclusion of adaptive functioning
and deficits in the diagnosis of intellectual disability serves to prevent
over-diagnosing and limit it to those persons who are significantly
affected and have an impaired capacity to function in society. 205
Furthermore, the accepted analysis of adaptive functioning focuses solely
on deficits,206 rather than strengths, by looking to everyday activities and
functions that one is unable to perform, not those that one does well or
better than expected.207 Without deficits, clinical professionals agree that
203. See Brief of Amici Curiae, the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental
Disabilities (AAIDD), and the Arc of the United States, in Support of Petitioner, supra note 164,
at 7 (noting the definition of intellectual disability including analysis of deficits in adaptive
functioning has existed for decades); ANNE ANASTASI & SUSANA URBINA, PSYCHOLOGICAL
TESTING 248 (Pete Janzow, ed., Prentice-Hall Inc. 7th ed. 1997) (1954) (“[I]ntellectual limitation
is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for [intellectual disability].”); AM. ASS’N ON MENTAL
DEFICIENCY, MANUAL ON TERMINOLOGY AND CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION 11
(Herbert J. Grossman ed., 1973) (“[Intellectual disability] refers to significantly subaverage general
intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior, and manifested
during the developmental period.”).
204. Brief of Amici Curiae, the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental
Disabilities (AAIDD), and the Arc of the United States, in Support of Petitioner, supra note 164,
at 8; see also Hall, 572 U.S. at 719–20 (“[T]hose persons who meet the ‘clinical definitions’ of
intellectual disability ‘by definition . . . have diminished capacities to understand and process
information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in
logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others.’” (quoting Atkins
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002))).
205. Brief of Amici Curiae, the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental
Disabilities (AAIDD), and the Arc of the United States, in Support of Petitioner, supra note 164,
at 7–8; see also AAIDD-11, supra note 123, at 43 (describing adaptive functioning and behavior
as the set of skills learned and used throughout one’s daily life); DSM-5, supra note 105, at 33
(requiring, for a diagnosis of intellectual disability, adaptive deficits such that a person cannot be
reasonably independent or socially responsible and need ongoing support to function capably at
home, work, and school).
206. Brief of Amici Curiae, the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental
Disabilities (AAIDD), and the Arc of the United States, in Support of Petitioner, supra note 164,
at 14 n.16 (noting myriad guides and diagnostic manuals that focus on limitations, deficits, or
impairments).
207. Brief of Amici Curiae, the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental
Disabilities (AAIDD), and the Arc of the United States, in Support of Petitioner, supra note 164,
at 15. Importantly, however, experts agree that evaluating adaptive behavior in prison will often
yield flawed or stunted results. See DSM-5, supra note 105, at 38 (noting adaptive functioning may
be harder to analyze in prison); Caroline Everington et al., Challenges in the Assessment of Adaptive
Behavior of People Who Are Incarcerated, in THE DEATH PENALTY AND INTELLECTUAL
DISABILITY 201, 201–02 (Edward A. Polloway ed., 2015) (asserting that an accurate look at
adaptive behavior is impossible in prison because inmates do not make any independent choices
about their daily lives, such as cooking food and dressing themselves); Marc J. Tassé, Adaptive
Behavior Assessment and the Diagnosis of Mental Retardation in Capital Cases, 16 APPLIED
NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 114, 119 (2009) (describing prisons as artificial environments that do not give
enough opportunity to demonstrate adaptive behaviors).
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one cannot be diagnosed with intellectual disability. Conversely, deficits
should not be counterbalanced with adaptive strengths, as Texas courts
have done, to weigh against such a diagnosis.208 Diminished adaptive
abilities in everyday life are clinically viewed as manifestations of
limitations seen in the first prong of intellectual functioning. 209 Finally,
the clinical focus on deficits is most important because some relative
adaptive strengths almost always coexist with adaptive deficits.210 A
legal determination of intellectual disability must be reflective of the
clinical understanding, which recognizes that these commingling
characteristics do not preclude diagnosis.211
Next, states cannot outright ignore established scientific standards
when dealing with intellectual disability cases.212 These standards change
208. Brief of Amici Curiae, the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental
Disabilities (AAIDD), and the Arc of the United States, in Support of Petitioner, supra note 164,
at 17; see also Ex parte Cathey, 451 S.W.3d 1, 26–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (“[S]ound scientific
principles require the factfinder to consider all possible data that sheds light on a person’s adaptive
functioning, including his conduct in a prison society, school setting, or ‘free world’ community.”
(emphasis in original)); Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 489 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (using a test
that weighs strengths and weaknesses, contrary to the accepted medical standards); AAIDD-11,
supra note 123, at 47 (“[S]ignificant limitations in conceptual, social, or practical adaptive skills
[are] not outweighed by the potential strengths in some adaptive skills.”).
209. Brief of Amici Curiae, the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental
Disabilities (AAIDD), and the Arc of the United States, in Support of Petitioner, supra note 164,
at 17–18; see also Hall, 572 U.S. at 723 (“Intellectual disability is a condition, not a number.”).
210. Brief of Amici Curiae, the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental
Disabilities (AAIDD), and the Arc of the United States, in Support of Petitioner, supra note 164,
at 19 (“[P]ractically every individual who has intellectual disability also has things that he or she
has learned to do, and can do.”); see also Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2281 (2015)
(“[I]ntellectually disabled persons may have strengths in social or physical capabilities, strengths
in some adaptive skill areas, or strengths in one aspect of an adaptive skill in which they otherwise
show an overall limitation.” (internal quotations omitted) (quoting AM. ASS’N OF MENTAL
RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION, DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF
SUPPORTS 8 (10th ed. 2002))); Caroline Everington, Challenges of Conveying Intellectual
Disabilities to Judge and Jury, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 467, 471 (2014) (“[T]he presence of
a defendant’s strengths in some areas, such as having a history of steady employment or possessing
academic skills in the fourth to sixth grade range, is to be expected and does not preclude a diagnosis
of [intellectual disability].”).
211. Brief of Amici Curiae, the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental
Disabilities (AAIDD), and the Arc of the United States, in Support of Petitioner, supra note 164,
at 19–20; see also J. Gregory Olley, The Death Penalty, the Courts, and Intellectual Disabilities,
in THE HANDBOOK OF HIGH-RISK CHALLENGING BEHAVIORS IN PEOPLE WITH INTELLECTUAL
AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 229, 233 (James K. Luiselli ed., 2012) (“[P]eople with mild
ID [intellectual disability] are a heterogeneous group with individual profiles of relative strengths
and weaknesses. One cannot argue that the presence of a particular strength rules out ID,
particularly if it is a strength shared with others with ID.”); Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 45, at
427 (“[Intellectually disabled] people are individuals. Any attempt to describe them as a group risks
false stereotyping and therefore demands the greatest caution.”).
212. See Hall, 572 U.S. at 723 (asserting that defendants must have the opportunity to show
evidence of adaptive deficits); Brief of Amici Curiae, the American Association on Intellectual and
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over time with improved clinical and scientific understanding of
intellectual disability, and courts must be able to consider these new and
refined guidelines.213 Importantly, the Supreme Court has recognized this
fact in other cases involving psychology by considering the current state
of the relevant medical or scientific field.214 However, the CCA had
rejected the accepted scientific principles, in stark contrast to the Court’s
directive in Hall.215 Its use of adaptive strengths to support its decision is
supported by almost no authority, placing it well outside the medical
community’s diagnostic framework.216 Lastly, the Briseno factors are
also outside the scope of accepted clinical practice and have been rejected
both by scholars as well as practitioners in the field.217
Looking to national consensus to formulate a rule, the Court noted that
Texas is an outlier among the states in routinely depriving intellectually
disabled individuals of constitutional protection under Atkins.218 When a
Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD), and the Arc of the United States, in Support of Petitioner,
supra note 164, at 27 (noting that scientific and clinical consensus regarding diagnostic standards
for deficits is as well established as the standards for intellectual functioning, and is also just as
important to the determination of intellectual disability).
213. Brief of Amici Curiae, the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental
Disabilities (AAIDD), and the Arc of the United States, in Support of Petitioner, supra note 164,
at 27 (“Clinical understanding cannot, of course, be treated as if it were fixed in amber, and any
requirement for courts to willfully blind their eyes to proven advances in scientific understanding
is inconsistent with basic Constitutional principles.”).
214. Id.; see also Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010) (“[D]evelopments in psychology
and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds.”);
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 472 n.5 (2012) (“The evidence presented to us in these cases
indicates that the science and social science supporting Roper’s and Graham’s conclusions have
become even stronger.”).
215. Hall, 572 U.S. at 721 (“The legal determination of intellectual disability is distinct from a
medical diagnosis, but it is informed by the medical community’s diagnostic framework.”); Brief
of Amici Curiae, the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities
(AAIDD), and the Arc of the United States, in Support of Petitioner, supra note 164, at 28.
216. Brief of Amici Curiae, the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental
Disabilities (AAIDD), and the Arc of the United States, in Support of Petitioner, supra note 164,
at 28 n.33.
217. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 593.005 (West 2017) (detailing Texas’s clinical
guidelines for determining the presence of an intellectual disability); Brief of Amici Curiae, the
American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD), and the Arc of the
United States, in Support of Petitioner, supra note 164, at 28–31 (noting that Texas uses clinical
guidelines and definitions of intellectual disability for all legal purposes other than death penalty
cases); Everington, supra note 210, at 481 (“Using these seven [Briseno] factors as part of a
diagnosis has the potential (if strictly interpreted) to exclude anyone functioning in the mild ID
range from the protection of Atkins.”).
218. Brief for the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 18,
Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017) (No. 15-797); see also Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1052 (“The
Briseno factors are an outlier, in comparison both to other States’ handling of intellectual-disability
pleas and to Texas’ own practices in other contexts.”); see generally Peggy M. Tobolowsky, A
Different Path Taken: Texas Capital Offenders’ Post-Atkins Claims of Mental Retardation, 39
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (2011).
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state is isolated, as Texas was in this case, it stands as evidence of a
national consensus against the practice in question.219 In practice,
Texas’s rule has almost certainly led to individuals being put on death
row and has possibly led to executions of individuals who would have
been exempt in other jurisdictions.220
Texas was also the only state to use the Briseno factors and to forbid
the use of modern clinical standards.221 In recent cases, Oregon,
Mississippi, California, and Indiana have all complied with Hall in
utilizing newly established medical or clinical standards.222 Furthermore,
most courts outside of Texas have either implicitly or directly rejected
Briseno and Texas’s method of analyzing adaptive behavior.223 Although
most states have not addressed the exact question raised in Moore, still
219. Brief for the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra
note 218, at 18; see also Hall, 572 U.S. at 718 (holding that, where a majority of the states have
rejected a procedural method for imposing the death penalty, that stands as strong evidence of a
national consensus regarding it as improper and inhumane).
220. Brief for the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra
note 218, at 18–19; see also Hall, 572 U.S. at 723 (holding Florida’s IQ cutoff rule unconstitutional
due to the risk it created of executing intellectually disabled defendants); Brief for Amicus Curiae
The Constitution Project in Support of Petitioner at 5–6, Moore, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (No. 15-797)
(noting that Texas’s death penalty decisions involving intellectual disability oftentimes require
intervention and correction by the Supreme Court). See Brief for the American Bar Association as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 218, at 22–27 for a discussion of three Texas
defendants, in addition to Moore, whose petitions for relief under Atkins were denied because of
Briseno.
221. Brief for Amicus Curiae The Constitution Project in Support of Petitioner, supra note 220,
at 10 (claiming that most states require or at least permit the use of modern and up-to-date standards,
while Texas actually forbids their use).
222. Id. at 10–12; see also In re Hawthorne, 105 P.3d 552, 557 (Cal. 2005) (citing to and relying
on then-current clinical guidelines and manuals to reject a strict IQ cutoff, nine years before Hall
was decided); Pruitt v. State, 834 N.E.2d 90, 108 (Ind. 2005) (recognizing that a state’s definition
of intellectual disability must “generally conform” to that of the national consensus and clinical
authorities); Chase v. State, 171 So. 3d 463, 471 (Miss. 2015) (“[J]udicial recognition of the new
terminology conforms with the directives of Atkins and Hall and will facilitate legal determinations
of intellectual disability by allowing our courts to rely on the newer, generally-accepted definitions
most frequently used by modern clinicians. We now adopt the 2010 AAIDD and 2013 APA
definitions of intellectual disability as appropriate for use to determine intellectual disability in the
courts of this state . . . .”); State v. Agee, 364 P.3d 971, 989 (Or. 2015) (reversing a trial court’s
Atkins decision that did not have the opportunity to use the most recent DSM-5, thus creating an
unacceptable risk that an individual with intellectual disability may be executed).
223. Brief for the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra
note 218, at 20–21; see also Van Tran v. Colson, 764 F.3d 594, 608–12 (6th Cir. 2014) (overturning
the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals, which had emphasized adaptive strengths in its
determination of intellectual disability); United States v. Candelario-Santana, 916 F. Supp. 2d 191,
212 (D.P.R. 2013) (rejecting the prosecutor’s request to use Briseno because the factors were not
as consistent with Atkins as other factors and tests that were available); United States v.
Montgomery, No. 2:11-cr-20044-JPM-1, 2014 WL 1516147, at *48 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 28, 2014)
(using the approach of other federal courts instead of Briseno because they were more adherent to
clinical standards).
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none have deviated in the way Texas did here.224 The only state that
comes close is Pennsylvania, and even there, the courts still utilize
clinical definitions first and foremost, with the Briseno factors merely
permitted but not required in the analysis. 225 In looking to clear and
objective evidence of the practice of states, the Supreme Court was
correct in holding that Texas’s system was out of touch with societal
views and evolving standards of decency.226
The dissent’s argument that the professional community is splintered
in its diagnosis of intellectual disability is unpersuasive, as there is
professional consensus on the objective diagnostic criteria at issue in
Moore.227 Both Atkins and Hall recognized this consensus and gave
authority to definitions used by the APA and the AAIDD.228 Indeed, both
the DSM-5 and the AAIDD-11 recognize the centrality of coexisting
intellectual and adaptive functioning deficits to the determination of
intellectual disability.229 Finally, the relatedness inquiry on which the
224. Brief for Amicus Curiae The Constitution Project in Support of Petitioner, supra note 220,
at 12; see also Tobolowsky, supra note 218, at 142 (“[T]he Texas Court has clearly taken a path
that differs from the other states both in its actions and in its failure to act regarding its Atkins
definition and procedures.”).
225. Brief for Amicus Curiae The Constitution Project in Support of Petitioner, supra note 220,
at 12–13; Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 58 A.3d 62, 86 (Pa. 2012) (“Because the Briseno factors
relate directly to considerations in Atkins and appear to be particularly helpful in cases of
retrospective assessment of [intellectual disability], we approve their use in Pennsylvania.
However, we note and emphasize that in Briseno the court did not adopt them as presumptions or
even as a checklist.”); see also Commonwealth v. Williams, 61 A.3d 979, 982 n.9 (Pa. 2013)
(noting that although the Briseno factors may be helpful, they are not to be given any favored or
presumptive status in the eyes of the factfinder).
226. Brief for Amicus Curiae The Constitution Project in Support of Petitioner, supra note 220,
at 13; see also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) (asserting the Eighth Amendment draws
its meaning from “evolving standards of decency”); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274–75
(1980) (explaining that the Court must use objective factors as much as possible when undertaking
Eighth Amendment analyses); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989) (noting that the actions
of states provide the most clear and objective evidence of national consensus and our society’s
standards).
227. Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological Association et al. in Support of Petitioner,
supra note 161, at 7 n.3 (noting that the definitions of intellectual disability used in the AAIDD-11
and DSM-5 do differ in some respects, but those differences are not relevant to the question
presented in Moore); see also Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 710–11 (2014) (noting clinical
definition of intellectual disability includes three main criteria: limitations in intellectual
functioning (as evidenced by IQ scores), limitations in adaptive functioning, and onset of said
limitations during developmental years).
228. Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological Association et al. in Support of Petitioner,
supra note 161, at 7; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308 n.3 (2002); Hall, 572 U.S. at 704.
229. Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological Association et al. in Support of Petitioner,
supra note 161, at 8; see also AAIDD-11, supra note 123, at 28 (“[E]qual consideration [must be
given] to significant limitations in adaptive behavior and intellectual functioning . . . .”); DSM-5,
supra note 105, at 37 (“The diagnosis of intellectual disability is based on both clinical assessment
and standardized testing of intellectual and adaptive functions.”).

448

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 50

CCA partially relied230 is only relevant insofar as it precludes other
physical ailments from affecting the diagnosis.231
Professionals also agree on the assessment methods of adaptive
functioning, stressing the importance of adaptive deficits as measured by
standardized tests.232 An individual must have a significant limitation or
deficit in at least one skill area, whereby intellectual disability can and
should be diagnosed.233 Significantly, again, there is professional
consensus that these adaptive deficits are indicative of intellectual
disability even when they are concomitant with manifestations of
adaptive strengths.234 Finally, although the CCA in Briseno warily
asserted that such diagnoses were rooted in subjectivity, 235 the testing
methods currently used meet all measurable requirements for
standardization, reliability, and validity. 236 When assessed in accordance
with clinically accepted tests and guidelines, subjectivity is all but a
logical impossibility.237
Next, the goal of the Briseno factors is to limit the scope of protection
under Atkins—in the midst of a legislative vacuum wherein Texas had
not yet implemented it statutorily—such that it unconstitutionally
excludes mildly intellectually disabled individuals who are deemed
undeserving of that protection.238 The CCA in Briseno, tasked with
230. Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 486 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
231. Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological Association et al. in Support of Petitioner,
supra note 161, at 8–9.
232. Id. at 11; see also AAIDD-11, supra note 123, at 47; DSM-5, supra note 105, at 37.
233. Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological Association et al. in Support of Petitioner,
supra note 161, at 13; see also AAIDD-11, supra note 123, at 47 (describing a significant limitation
as one that is at least two standard deviations below the mean); DSM-5, supra note 105, at 37–38
(asserting that at least one domain of functioning must be impaired so as to require ongoing support
for the individual’s performance of everyday activities).
234. Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological Association et al. in Support of Petitioner,
supra note 161, at 13; see also Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2281 (2015) (stating in dicta
that intellectually disabled individuals are likely to have a mixture of strengths in various social
skills or adaptive skills, while exhibiting overall limitations in other adaptive skill areas (citing AM.
ASS’N OF MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION, DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND
SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 8 (10th ed. 2002))); AAIDD-11, supra note 123, at 45 (noting that adaptive
strengths are often present along with adaptive limitations).
235. Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
236. Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological Association et al. in Support of Petitioner,
supra note 161, at 11–12; see also J. Gregory Olley, Adaptive Behavior Instruments, in THE DEATH
PENALTY AND INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY supra note 207, at 187, 187–89 (noting the ongoing
refinement and development of testing methods has resulted in three reliable diagnostic scales).
237. Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological Association et al. in Support of Petitioner,
supra note 161, at 12–13.
238. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Texas, in
Support of Petitioner at 8, Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017) (No. 15-797); see also Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563–64 (2005) (“[T]he [Atkins] Court ruled that the death penalty
constitutes an excessive sanction for the entire category of [intellectually disabled] offenders . . . .”);
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creating a rule to apply the Eighth Amendment protection of Atkins,
critically misinterpreted the Supreme Court’s mandate that the states
prohibit this type of punishment as also allowing states to continue to
execute individuals with a mild intellectual disability.239 After
highlighting the high percentage of persons recognized as mildly
disabled240 and their ability to improve functional skills with proper
assistance over time,241 the CCA then extrapolated what it believed to be
the professional community’s wide diagnosis of intellectual disability as
creating a “safety net” for those on the fringe of mild intellectual
disability.242 In doing so, the CCA then assumed the responsibility of
defining the range of individuals to be exempted in Texas under Atkins
and enacted a rule that empowers a factfinder to unscientifically
determine whether a defendant is mildly intellectually disabled or merely
has a personality disorder.243
In enacting this rule rooted in subjectivity, the Briseno court dodged
its responsibility under Atkins by incorrectly conflating the decision of
who is intellectually disabled with a decision of which intellectually
disabled persons should be exempt from the death penalty under the
Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 6 (stating that the capital punishment ban for the intellectually
disabled will be extended only to those whom a consensus of Texans believes “should be” exempt
from the death penalty); Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 528 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (Alcala,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority in Ex parte Moore cannot shirk its own responsibility to
comply with Atkins merely because the Texas legislature had not codified the rule from Atkins).
239. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Texas, in
Support of Petitioner, supra note 238, at 9–10. It is important to note that not only do most
intellectually disabled persons fall in the category of mildly disabled persons, but also that those
who are “higher” on the scale of intellectual disability are almost completely incapable of
committing capital crimes. Id. at 9 nn.6–7. See also Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 5 (noting the
remark in Atkins that not all of those who seek protection under the Eighth Amendment will be so
disabled as determined by a national consensus (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317
(2002))); Macvaugh & Cunningham, supra note 185, at 136 (“The seven criteria of the Briseno
opinion operationalize an Atkins interpretation that only exempts a subcategory of persons with [an
intellectually disability] from execution.”).
240. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Texas, in
Support of Petitioner, supra note 238, at 10; Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 5–6; see also DSM-4,
supra note 81, at 41 (noting that roughly eighty-five percent of diagnoses fall into the mild
category).
241. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Texas, in
Support of Petitioner, supra note 238, at 10; see also Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 6; DSM-4,
supra note 81, at 44 (explaining that intellectual disability does not necessarily last throughout
one’s entire lifetime, as persons who exhibited characteristics of mild intellectual disability via
academic failure may develop strengths in other adaptive skills if given the right opportunities and
training).
242. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Texas, in
Support of Petitioner, supra note 238, at 10; Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 6.
243. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Texas, in
Support of Petitioner, supra note 238, at 10–12; Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 6–8.
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Eighth Amendment.244 Indeed, the Atkins Court handed down its rule in
response to a mildly intellectually disabled petitioner,245 and Justice
Scalia’s dissent in that case was actually focused on the majority’s
categorical ban being too far reaching.246 If the scope of protection were
ever in doubt, the Court recently reprised and confirmed this piece of
Atkins in Brumfield v. Cain.247 In Brumfield, the Court held that a
petitioner whose IQ score lies in a range of potential mild intellectual
disability was improperly denied the chance to acquit himself with
evidence of that disability.248 Brumfield also explicitly stressed that a
personality disorder can accompany the adaptive deficits that signal
intellectual disability, discrediting the opposite implication in Briseno.249
Ultimately, however, it is the Eighth Amendment itself and the Court’s
precedent that stands against the CCA’s reasoning in Briseno.250 States
do not have free reign to demarcate the boundaries of the Amendment’s
protection as they see fit—to do so would contradict the very object and
purpose of Atkins.251
The Briseno factors also deprive defendants of their dignity and
contravene standards of decency under the Eighth Amendment by relying
on stereotypes, which leads to unreliable and arbitrary judgments.252 In
244. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Texas, in
Support of Petitioner, supra note 238, at 12; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002).
245. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Texas, in
Support of Petitioner, supra note 238, at 12; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308.
246. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Texas, in
Support of Petitioner, supra note 238, at 12–13; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 338–42 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
247. See generally Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269 (2015); Brief Amicus Curiae of the
American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Texas, in Support of Petitioner, supra note 238,
at 13.
248. Brumfield, 135 S. Ct. at 2278; Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union
and the ACLU of Texas, in Support of Petitioner, supra note 238, at 13.
249. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Texas, in
Support of Petitioner, supra note 238, at 13; see also Brumfield, 135 S. Ct. at 2280 (“[A]n antisocial
personality is not inconsistent with any of the above-mentioned areas of adaptive impairment, or
with intellectual disability more generally.”); Ex Parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. Crim. App.
2004).
250. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Texas, in
Support of Petitioner, supra note 238, at 13–14; see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316–17.
251. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Texas, in
Support of Petitioner, supra note 238, at 14; see also Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 719 (2014)
(“Atkins did not give the States unfettered discretion to define the full scope of the constitutional
protection.”).
252. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Texas, in
Support of Petitioner, supra note 238, at 14; see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976)
(requiring imposition of the death penalty to be carried out in a manner that is not arbitrary); Beck
v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 638 (1980) (noting that the Court will strike down as invalid any
procedural rules that render the sentencing process less reliable); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 (holding
that states are limited by the Constitution to create appropriate means of enforcing the Eighth
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employing seven subjective, stereotypical, and nondiagnostic factors by
which a factfinder may determine intellectual disability, Briseno allows
judges to define it on a case-by-case basis and inherently tends toward
unreliability.253 Importantly, the CCA utilized the Briseno factors to
bolster its holding that Moore was not intellectually disabled,
emphasizing the very same type of unacceptable subjective and anecdotal
evidence as reason to reject the habeas court’s recommendation.254
In sum, Briseno is wholly nonclinical and thus unconstitutional under
both Atkins and Hall.255 The Atkins Court used scientific and medical
tools to properly determine whether a defendant was intellectually
disabled and protected under the Eighth Amendment.256 In Hall, the
Court revisited Atkins and built upon its holding, stating that “clinical
definitions of intellectual disability . . . were a fundamental premise of
Atkins.”257 Under Atkins, any approach that disregards established
medical practice is flatly out of touch with the Eighth Amendment.258
IV. MOORE WILL PROMPT NUMEROUS APPEALS AND MAKE IT MORE
DIFFICULT FOR STATES TO IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY, BUT TOTAL
ABOLITION IS NOWHERE IN SIGHT
The decision in Moore is one that tightens and clarifies the rules of
Atkins and Hall and will thereby give states more reason for pause when
deciding capital cases. The decision will also prompt even more death
penalty appeals based on intellectual disability, especially in Texas.259
Amendment prohibition of capital punishment for those intellectually disabled persons); Hall, 572
U.S. at 724 (holding that states cannot deny individuals of their basic dignity, which is protected
by the Constitution).
253. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Texas, in
Support of Petitioner, supra note 238, at 28; see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320–21 (stressing that
factfinders oftentimes failed to view intellectual disability as a mitigating factor, in fact frequently
leading to harsher punishments). See Chester v. Thaler, 666 F.3d 340, 371 (5th Cir. 2011) (Dennis,
J., dissenting), Lizcano v. State, No. AP–75,879, 2010 WL 1817772, *35 (Tex. Crim. App. May 5,
2010) (Price, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and Ex Parte Cathey, 451 S.W.3d 1, 28
(Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (Price, J., concurring), for expressions of concern by CCA as well as Fifth
Circuit judges about the Briseno factors.
254. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Texas, in
Support of Petitioner, supra note 238, at 29; see also Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 526–27
(Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
255. Brief for the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra
note 218, at 7.
256. Id.; see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3 (utilizing the then-current AAMR-9 for the threepronged definition of intellectual disability).
257. Hall, 572 U.S. at 720; Brief for the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Petitioner, supra note 218, at 8.
258. Hall, 572 U.S. at 720–21; Brief for the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioner, supra note 218, at 8.
259. Carol Steiker & Jordan Steiker, Death-Penalty Symposium: Incremental Victories for
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The Houston metropolitan area in Harris County alone saw five appeals
between March and October 2017.260 Based on its death row population,
the Harris County District Attorney expected six to ten additional appeals
by the end of 2018.261 The CCA has already stayed several executions
and remanded others to state habeas courts for further review of
appropriate evidence as required by Moore.262 Each case is obviously
different, but if the convictions of these defendants were previously
upheld based on the rules and framework of Briseno, Texas is likely to
see a number of death sentences overturned.263
In fact, the Supreme Court has already vacated the judgment against
one San Antonio defendant and remanded that case to the Fifth Circuit.264
More recently, in January 2019, the Supreme Court vacated and
remanded White v. Kentucky for further consideration in light of Moore,
even though the Kentucky Supreme Court had upheld the petitioner’s
death sentence in that case five months after Moore was decided.265 And,
after the Court remanded Moore’s case, the CCA again found that Moore
was not intellectually disabled.266 Moore appealed again to the Supreme
Court which held, due in part to the CCA’s continued reliance on the
Briseno factors, that the CCA was incorrect in finding Moore had not
shown intellectual disability.267 But, rather than take this opportunity to
clearly delineate why the CCA’s analysis was insufficient, the Court
stated that the opinion simply “rests upon analysis too much of which too
closely resembles what we previously found improper. And extricating
that analysis from the opinion leaves too little that might warrant reaching
a different conclusion than did the trial court.”268
Capital Defendants but No Sweeping Change, SCOTUSBLOG (June 28, 2017, 10:58 AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/death-penalty-symposium-incremental-victories-capitaldefendants-no-sweeping-change/.
260. See Brian Rogers, Texas Attorneys Brace for New Death Penalty Appeals After Supreme
Court
Ruling,
HOUS.
CHRON.
(Oct.
15,
2017,
3:08
PM),
http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Texas-attorneys-brace-fornew-round-of-death-12271127.php (noting the five appeals in Harris County and ten total appeals
through all of Texas in the time span from March 28, when Moore was decided, to October 15).
261. Id.
262. See, e.g., Ex parte Guevara, No. WR-63,926-03, 2018 WL 2717041 (Tex. Crim. App. June
6, 2018); Ex parte Long, No. WR-76,324-02, 2017 WL 3616644 (Tex. Crim. App. Aug. 21, 2017).
263. Rogers, supra note 260; Steiker & Steiker, supra note 259.
264. Weathers v. Davis, 138 S. Ct. 315 (2017); Weathers v. Davis, 659 F. App’x 778 (5th Cir.
2016); see also Rogers, supra note 260 (noting the remand in the Weathers case).
265. White v. Kentucky, 139 S. Ct. 532 (2019).
266. Moore v. Texas, No. 18-443, slip op. at 5 (U.S. Feb. 2, 2019) (per curiam).
267. Id. at 8 (“[D]espite the court of appeals’ statement that it would ‘abandon reliance on the
Briseno evidentiary factors,’ it seems to have used many of those factors in reaching its
conclusion.” (citation omitted) (quoting Ex parte Moore II, 548 S.W.3d 552, 560 (2018))).
268. Id. at 10.
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State’s attorneys desire clear and stable rules, which the Court does not
currently provide.269 The new rule from Moore will make the death
penalty more difficult to impose than it already was, especially in states
that have not imposed legislation to enact the prior rule from Atkins.270
Federal habeas reviews, like the one in Moore v. Texas, are becoming less
predictable, making it even more difficult for attorneys to adequately
defend the states’ cases.271 This is so even though the goal of such habeas
cases is to leave convictions alone unless there is glaring and egregious
error that is prejudicial to the defendant.272 Of course, it is a difficult job
on both sides—fighting for those who are innocent or undeserving of the
death penalty and fighting to uphold convictions of those who are
rightfully sentenced—and the tug of war will continue unless the Court
hands down a broader rule.273
To that end, the Supreme Court may take more significant steps
regarding the death penalty in future terms, as this term mainly dealt with
spot-checks rather than broad rule changes.274 Relatedly, four states
voted on propositions involving the death penalty, and the result was a
resounding victory for supporters of capital punishment.275 For example,
in the November 2016 election, Nebraska voters reversed a repeal of the
death penalty that the state legislature passed just eighteen months
prior.276 California’s effort to repeal the death penalty also failed and,
conversely, its citizens passed a measure that reduces delay in processes
surrounding execution of death row inmates.277 This will not go
269. Joseph Tartakovsky, Death-Penalty Symposium: In Search of Predictability,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 29, 2017, 11:30 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/death-penaltysymposium-search-predictability/.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. See Kent Scheidegger, Death-Penalty Symposium: Supreme Court Marks Time for a Term
on
Capital
Punishment,
SCOTUSBLOG
(June
28,
2017,
4:11
PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/death-penalty-symposium-supreme-court-marks-time-termcapital-punishment (asserting that the death penalty cases, including Moore, were cases that
primarily corrected individual errors and did not establish new or far reaching rules).
275. Id.
276. Id.; Paul Hammel, Nebraskans Vote Overwhelmingly to Restore Death Penalty, Nullify
Historic 2015 Vote by State Legislature, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (Nov. 9, 2016),
http://www.omaha.com/news/politics/nebraskans-vote-overwhelmingly-to-restore-death-penaltynullify-historic-vote/article_38823d54-a5df-11e6-9a5e-d7a71d75611a.html.
277. Scheidegger, supra note 274; Times Editorial Bd., California’s Supreme Court Should Put
Proposition 66 Out of Its Misery, L.A. TIMES (June 9, 2017, 5:00 AM),
http://beta.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-proposition-66-death-penalty-20170609story.html; see also Liliana Segura, The Death Penalty Won Big on Election Day, but the Devil Is
in the Details, THE INTERCEPT (Nov. 11, 2016, 8:20 AM), https://theintercept.com/2016/11/11/thedeath-penalty-won-big-on-election-day-but-the-devil-is-in-the-details/.
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unnoticed if the Supreme Court again addresses national consensus and
whether application of the death penalty passes muster under the Eighth
Amendment.278
The application of the rule from Moore will inevitably involve, as
Chief Justice Roberts lamented, an expansion of the rule from Hall.279 In
the eyes of advocacy groups, this is not necessarily a bad thing. But the
accepted clinical and diagnostic criteria and standards change with time,
as noted by the arguments of both sides.280 As such, if the criteria for the
definition of intellectual disability change in the next iteration of the
AAIDD Manual or DSM, defendants who were convicted under the old
scheme will raise a new defense that their death sentence now violates
the Eighth Amendment.281
The looseness of Moore’s clarification on Atkins and Hall still leaves
states enough leeway to find themselves in a constitutional dilemma.282
The Court is doing everything it can to find a middle ground that still
respects the states’ authority over their own justice systems. However,
this issue will continue to be litigated as appeals come forth and until the
Court makes a more sweeping change.283 While the Court clearly did not
give constitutional authority to professional bodies such as the American
278. Scheidegger, supra note 274.
279. Id.; see also Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1061 (2017) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(noting that this rule can be read to require complete rigidity in reading IQ scores with the full SEM
range and to disallow any reason for discounting the lower range of an IQ range).
280. Scheidegger, supra note 274; see also Brief of Amici Curiae, the American Association
on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD), and the Arc of the United States, in
Support of Petitioner, supra note 164, at 27 (“Clinical understanding cannot, of course, be treated
as if it were fixed in amber, and any requirement for courts to willfully blind their eyes to proven
advances in scientific understanding is inconsistent with basic Constitutional principles.”).
281. See Draye, supra note 186 (“As soon as professional associations revise their thinking in
a manner that would expand the boundaries of intellectual disability, death-row inmates who would
benefit from the new guidelines will immediately raise Eighth Amendment claims.”).
282. Scheidegger, supra note 274; see also Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1058 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(arguing the majority’s use of the word “disregard” is inappropriate—the CCA fully regarded and
considered the current clinical standards and chose, as the ultimate factfinder, to lean away); Ex
parte Cathey, 451 S.W.3d 1, 26–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (“[C]ourts should not become so
entangled with the opinions of psychiatric experts as to lose sight of the basic factual nature of the
Atkins inquiry: Is this person capable of functioning adequately in his everyday world with
intellectual understanding and moral appreciation of his behavior wherever he is? . . . In that
inquiry, we should not turn a blind eye to the inmate’s ability to use society and his environment to
serve his own needs. And sound scientific principles require the factfinder to consider all possible
data that sheds light on a person’s adaptive functioning, including his conduct in a prison society,
school setting, or ‘free world’ community.” (citing United States v. Montgomery, No. 2:11-CR20044-JPM-1, 2014 WL 1516147, at *49 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 28, 2014); Clark v. Quarterman, 457
F.3d 441, 447 (5th Cir. 2006))); Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 489 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015)
(looking to the entire record and considering all functional abilities to make the intellectual
disability determination).
283. Scheidegger, supra note 274; Steiker & Steiker, supra note 259.
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Psychiatric Association, their influence is still undeniable.284 In this
regard, Moore raised as many questions as it answered.285
In 2015, Justice Breyer laid out the argument for abolition of the death
penalty in Glossip v. Gross with a dissenting opinion that questioned the
basic constitutionality of the death penalty. 286 Breyer found the
geographic clustering of the death penalty to be unusual, and he further
argued it was cruel based on evidence of wrongful convictions, delays in
executions, and perceived arbitrariness in its administration.287 It is
likely, though, that the Court is still not ready to move forward and
address Breyer’s position in one way or another, as most of the recent
merits cases dealing with the death penalty were heard to grant relief and
redress gross legal error.288 Even with fewer death sentences and
executions, the Court continues to be visible in hearing these
cases—though its reviews may be for appearances only. 289 In an even
more recent denial of certiorari, Hidalgo v. Arizona, Justice Breyer noted
specifically that Arizona’s system of capital punishment may be
unconstitutional.290
The makeup of the Court will also determine its next steps in deciding
death penalty cases. With Justice Gorsuch replacing the late Justice Scalia
and Justice Kavanaugh replacing Justice Kennedy, outcomes of cases
involving intellectual disability may or may not change.291 Hall was
284. Scheidegger, supra note 274.
285. Id.
286. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755–77 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Steiker
& Steiker, supra note 259 (discussing the legislative landscape on the death penalty leading up to
Glossip). In the decade leading up to Glossip, seven states had legislated the death penalty out of
existence, executions in other states had decreased by eighty percent, and death sentences had
decreased by ninety percent since their peak in the mid-1990s. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 259.
287. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2755–77; see also Steiker & Steiker, supra note 259 (“The latter
point has been of particular concern to Breyer, who has noted the suffering caused by prolonged
death-row incarceration as well as the ways in which delay undercuts the deterrent and retributive
rationales of the death penalty.”).
288. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 259 (describing the cases as very fact specific and the
lack of breadth in the Court’s opinions).
289. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 259 (noting the trend over the past forty years of the
Supreme Court reviewing a disproportionate amount of death penalty cases—four were reviewed
in 2016, and there were only thirty death sentences and twenty executions); Kevin Barry, The Death
Penalty & the Dignity Clauses, 102 IOWA L. REV. 383, 418 (2017) (outlining the two-pronged
objective and subjective inquiries that may be considered by the Court, if it addresses the broad
question of constitutionality of the death penalty).
290. Hidalgo v. Arizona, 138 S. Ct. 1054, 1055 (2018) (denying certiorari). See also Adam
Liptak, Supreme Court Won’t Hear Challenges to Arizona’s Death Penalty Law, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/us/supreme-court-death-penalty.html (discussing
the Supreme Court’s decision to deny review of the death penalty in Hidalgo v. Arizona).
291. See Adam Liptak, How Brett Kavanaugh Would Transform the Supreme Court, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/02/us/politics/judge-kavanaughsupreme-court-justices.html (noting that although Kavanaugh will likely not extend any additional
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decided by a bare majority and Moore five to three; all indications point
to Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh voting with the more conservative
bloc of Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Thomas should this
issue arise again.292
Despite the recent poll and ballot measures that have been passed,
research shows overall public support of the death penalty in America is
indeed declining along with the rate of actual death sentences and
executions.293 The Court continued a recent trend of general discomfort
with the death penalty, reversing most death sentences that it reviewed in
the October 2016 term.294 The Court ruled in favor of capital defendants
in five of the six cases; in the sixth, the state prevailed on procedural
grounds.295 The Court is likely to continue to avoid sweeping decisions
and concerns about the death penalty such as those Justice Breyer raised
in Glossip and Hidalgo.296
Although the Court has not addressed it, the administration of the death
penalty continues to raise suspicion of uneven and arbitrary
implementation.297 The Court in Moore has tangentially attempted to
curb the arbitrariness by condemning pervasive junk science practices,
such as those used by Texas, that began to appear after Atkins.298 Justice
Ginsburg’s opinion addresses issues in many current outstanding Atkins
claims that are matriculating through the appeals process.299 However, it
will remain to be seen what effect, if any, this will have on more recent
protections via categorical exemptions from the death penalty, that does not necessarily mean the
Court’s recent rulings will be overturned).
292. See Scheidegger, supra note 274 (noting Justice Gorsuch’s votes after he was confirmed
tend to show he will uphold “law and order” as Justice Scalia’s replacement); McAllister, supra
note 175 (noting the four justices comprising the liberal wing—Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and
Sotomayor—do not support the way the death penalty is imposed and attaching great import to the
effect future shifts in the makeup of the Court may have on possible abolition).
293. Brandon L. Garrett, The Decline of the Virginia (and American) Death Penalty, 105 GEO.
L.J. 661, 663–64 (2017); Kenneth Williams, Why the Death Penalty Is Slowly Dying, 46 SW. L.
REV. 253, 253–54 (2017); Kenneth Williams, Why and How the Supreme Court Should End the
Death Penalty, 51 U.S.F. L. REV. 271, 272–73 (2017).
294. See McAllister, supra note 175 (noting the Supreme Court’s frequent lack of deference to
state court decisions). The Court reversed four of the six death penalty cases in its 2016 term, with
one case affirmed in spite of procedural issues that are not strictly pertinent only in context of the
death penalty. Id.
295. Id.
296. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 259.
297. Brian Stull, Death-Penalty Symposium: The Court Keeps Treating a Fatally Diseased
Death
Penalty,
SCOTUSBLOG
(June
27,
2017,
4:14
PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/death-penalty-symposium-court-keeps-treating-fatallydiseased-death-penalty/; see Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Court is just “patch[ing] up the death penalty’s legal wounds one at a time”).
298. Stull, supra note 297.
299. Id.
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death sentences.300 Recently heard appeals come from cases decided in
1980,301 1986,302 and 1997303—years in which there were 173, 301, and
265 death sentences rendered, respectively. 304 These older cases from a
bygone era will continue to come up against these new stringencies being
placed upon the death penalty.305 The Court, in reviewing and possibly
overturning these cases, may find itself forced to confront larger issues
that plague the capital punishment system.
As a result of Moore, evolving standards will likely become even more
difficult to define and determine.306 Indeed, evaluating evolving
standards of decency was already troublesome—once a new standard is
determined, its precedential value makes it less flexible and more difficult
to adjust.307 The Court’s “evolving standards” test will continue to take
on more weight, meaning, and guidance from nonlegal sources.308 The
Court in Moore has come almost full circle from its rule in Atkins, which
only minimally utilized clinical and professional opinions and primarily
focused on state attitude and legislation.309 In Hall, the Court more
seriously considered the criteria of experts, but still hedged as to the
amount of deference to be given.310 In addition to relying on professional
guidance more heavily, the Hall Court appeared to twist the mode in
which it relies on state practice as well, by claiming forty-one total states
would have disagreed with the Florida Supreme Court.311 Indeed, this is
correct by way of negative inference, but it drew a shaky equivalence
between the states that do not have the death penalty at all and those that
do have the death penalty but properly interpret IQ scores for the purpose

300. Id.
301. Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1044 (2017).
302. McWilliams v. Dunn, 137 S. Ct. 1790, 1793 (2017).
303. Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 767–69 (2017).
304. Stull, supra note 297.
305. Id. (noting that many states, such as Arkansas last year, are forced to hurriedly administer
death sentences due to scarce lethal-injection drugs that are due to expire).
306. Draye, supra note 186 (addressing the difficulty with which the Supreme Court has
assessed evolving standards of decency).
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id. The opinions and standards from the professional and medical communities only
appeared in a footnote. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308 n.3 (2002); see also id. at 312 (“We
have pinpointed that the ‘clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is
the legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures.’” (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,
331 (1989))). But see generally Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017).
310. Draye, supra note 186; see also Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 710 (2014) (“This [i.e.,
utilizing professional guidelines] in turn leads to a better understanding of how the legislative
policies of various States, and the holdings of state courts, implement the Atkins rule.”).
311. Hall, 572 U.S. at 716.
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of determining intellectual disability.312
If there are more disagreements among professional associations in the
future, the Court will likely again confront a changing national
consensus.313 Switching from states’ practices to the APA’s intellectual
disability definition does not change the innate paradigm—just like
states, experts are not always unanimous314—although the proclamation
of an official statement or handbook gives the appearance of
unanimity.315 And again, if these “evolving standards” are ever
reconsidered by the professional community, the Court’s locking them
into a rule of law may prevent them from changing their position.316
However, professional organizations such as the APA are not actually
bound by the Court’s precedent, leaving them free to utilize their
expertise to reconsider appropriate standards and criteria drafting new
editions of clinical manuals.317
CONCLUSION
Moore v. Texas is a continuation and extension of the Supreme Court’s
recent Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, and it rightfully strengthens its
protection for the class of intellectually disabled persons that was
originally granted in Atkins v. Virginia and further clarified by Hall v.
Florida. The Court does not require that the Constitution kowtow to
professional or medical communities for determinations of a national
consensus. Rather, Moore mandates that courts are not free to disregard
current established medical standards in their legal determination of
intellectual disability, as this creates the unacceptable risk that
intellectually disabled persons might be executed. The rule from Texas’s
precedent in Ex parte Briseno, with its roots in subjectivity, stereotype,
and its logical dismissal of the guarantee of Atkins, creates a framework
under which intellectually disabled persons can be sentenced to death and
is therefore unconstitutional. As such, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals violated the Eighth Amendment by discounting the proper
standard error of measurement for Moore’s IQ score and precluding him
from presenting additional evidence of intellectual disability.

312. Draye, supra note 186.
313. Id. (“Deciding which opinion to follow is a task better suited to the legislative process than
to the judiciary.”).
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.

